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ABSTRACT

An innovative new framework for the implementation of reliability centered maintenance
(RCM) in industrial settings was developed and implemented during this study. Fuzzy
reasoning algorithms were designed to evaluate and assess the likelihood o f equipment
failure mode precipitation and aggravation. Furthermore, an alternative to the traditional
RCM decision tree for prioritizing equipment failure modes was defined through the
development of an approximate reasoning scheme. This priority scheme not only takes
into account the relevancy of failure modes on local and product effects, but also their
possibility of occurrence, as well as associated negative consequences on adjacent
machinery.
The new RCM approach was implemented through an objected-oriented expert
system built to perform reliability centered maintenance analysis on industrial chemical
processes.

The developed expert system reads the process flowsheet generated by

ASPEN Plus, a chemical process simulation package, and, based on relevant machine
operating data, it provides the user with the final process RCM availability structure
diagram. This availability diagram consists of a listing of all critical machine failure
modes likely to occur, prioritized according to their overall negative impact on the
process, as well as important information on their corresponding local and system effects,
and suggested controls for their detection.
Although the chemical process industry was selected as the application domain
for this research, the developed RCM framework was designed to be extensible across the
entire maintenance activity spectrum, regardless of the type of industry associated.
x
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The prototype knowledge based system was constructed and delivered on an IBM
compatible Personal Computer through an object oriented computer shell, LEVEL 5
Object.

xi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

During the last decades, the need for identifying cost-effective maintenance programs for
production plants and manufacturing facilities has generated a proliferation of global
analysis methodologies oriented to the development of competent reliability management
policies. Among these analytical methods, Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM),
which was first introduced by the civil aviation industry in the 1960’s, is not only the
most frequently used but also the technique that has proven to be the most effective
worldwide.
The RCM methodology provides a practical and structuredapproach for arriving
at a satisfactory maintenance strategy for each component of a given system. In choosing
a strategy, the methodology takes into account safety requirements, maintenance costs,
and costs of lost production (107). In essence, RCM can be defined as a technique for
organizing maintenance activities to be cost-effective.

Its central objective is to

determine the actions required to ensure that all physical assets continue to fulfill their
intended functions in their current operating environments.
RCM carries out its analysis by asking the following three questions:
1. What is the item’s function?
2. How can these functions fail?
3. What are the consequences o f its failure?

1
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The maintenance program for each individual item is then developed based on the facts
obtained from this query process.

Usually, these programs cover three levels of

maintenance actions. The first level has to do with leaving the item in service until it
fails; at that moment, the item is either repaired or replaced. For the second type of
maintenance, a schedule depicting the times at which each item has to be replaced or
overhauled is developed to ensure that components will not enter the wear-out phase due
to old age (see Figure 1.1).

The last level of maintenance involves a periodic or

continuous check of items to detect specific symptoms that a failure is upcoming (94,
100 ).

During the last years, several different frameworks have been adopted by
industrial practitioners in order to accommodate the RCM’s principles to their increasing
equipment maintenance demands. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the development of
computer software packages which embed either mathematical optimizing algorithms or
managerial rules of thumb or heuristics represent the most recent efforts in the area of
reliability management modeling. However, most of these computer programs fail in
providing a comprehensive tool for fully taking advantage of the benefits resulting from
an effective RCM plan. From the available published literature, it is clear that the major
shortcoming of newly developed maintenance software is its inability of conciliating the
traditional RCM methodology with other heuristic approaches. That is, no one of the
reported reliability management packages properly combines the use o f optimizing
algorithms such as linear and nonlinear models with non-optimizing techniques such as
fuzzy or approximate reasoning methodologies and qualitative rules of thumb. Thus, the
enormous economical and technical benefits of implementing such an integrating RCM
2
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approach remains unknown to industrial entrepreneurs.

The design of a computer

program that can accomplish this objective would involve the creation of a intelligent
system or expert system.
Expert systems have been defined as consulting systems that simulate the
problem-solving ability of human experts through the use of expertise drawn from an
information base and specific rules employed to interpret such knowledge (38).
There are several paradigms used to represent knowledge in an expert system.
Knowledge can be expressed in rules, frames, networks, and logical predicates. Rules
represent the most popular of all representation schemes. They are If-Then statements
which generate conclusions once the validity of specific facts (premises) has been
verified (6). A frame consists of a set o f slots that contains a group of specifications
describing an object, action, or event (38). Semantic networks represent a group of nodes
linked to form object relationships. Predicate logic is a kind of formal logic which is
used to make generalizations about propositions based on specific relationships (6).
Expert systems are structured in three distinct components (Figure 1.2).

The

knowledge base is a set of rules about the problem domain, supplied by the expert or
obtained through in-depth research. The working memory carries out the tracking of
what has been concluded or learned at any stage of a particular consultation. The
inference engine evaluates what is true at any given time in the working memory and the
knowledge base, resolving conflicts when necessary (38).
A computerized system can substantially improve the information handling
methods of the RCM methodology by integrating the subsystems in charge o f (a)

4
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managing the statistical parameters required for analyzing the characteristics of the
different component failure modes, (b) estimating the system/component failure modes
through the assessment of the failure mode effects (FME) and criticality analysis (CA),
and (c) determining the priority of preventive maintenance (PM) improvement plans (88).
In addition to this, the unification of Artificial Intelligence (Al) techniques with
conventional probabilistic methods and fuzzy measure approaches can incorporate
understanding of the fundamental dynamics among system components so that the RCM
analysis can provide appropriate and conclusive maintenance policies (105).
Expert systems have received the most attention of all Al techniques.

They

emphasize the mathematical and statistical capabilities of the computer by using dialogue
and logic to determine viable courses of action or outcomes (110). Thus, it is possible to
enhance and improve the process of selecting and recommending reliability management
procedures by encapsulating the knowledge of human experts and proven mathematical
models with a versatile knowledge based system.
1.2 Problem Statement

A crucial element in successful operations is an effective plant maintenance function. In
a competitive world, the only means for companies to survive is through minimization of
their production costs without sacrificing the quality of their goods or services.

For

example, it has been estimated that manufacturing companies in industrialized countries
such as the United Kingdom can save between 8% and 30% in operating costs through
improvement in maintenance policies (36). In the United States, the introduction o f RCM
methodologies has proven very beneficial. For instance, the application of the RCM
approach to the nuclear power industry since the mid 80’s has generated long-term
6
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benefits in reliability and safety improvements. Although the RCM benefits can not be
immediately appreciated, Figure 1.3 shows how, the nuclear power industry has
experienced annual maintenance man-hour and administrative savings of $108,000 per
plant, and an average reduction of 24% in the number of corrective maintenance actions
(26, 113).
Nevertheless, most of the reliability management programs followed by industries
across the nation still present considerable deficiencies which undermine their potential
benefits. For instance, nuclear plants in the U.S. spend about $2 billion per year on
reliability management programs.

Among these programs, only a small fraction are

based on a clear understanding of the relative importance of different reliability
management tasks and component failure modes (113). The need for an improved RCM
approach originates from the fact that the conventional failure mode effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA) method concentrates its effort only on the evaluation of the relevance
of the failure effects, without giving any importance to the analysis of the failure
environment (failure characteristics and detectability) whose control and study results are
critical in generating assertive corrective and preventive maintenance policies. (88).
Traditional RCM analysis first encompasses the identification of critical
components from a risk and economics perspective.

Usually, a probabilistic safety

assessment is carried out to establish the relative importance of the system’s components
from a risk perspective. Moreover, appropriate risk measures are devised and used to
effectively rank the different element failure modes which allow the determination of the
individual component criticality.

Once the selection of component criticality is

7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

One-time costsfor RCM
$ISO,000

Cumulative maintenance
man-hour savings

4---- 4 yeans p tqp * q ff

After 4 years

$ 100,000

After 3 years

$50,000

After 2 years
After 1 y ears
Cost
in
1988

Cost Trend
in
1991
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completed, applicable and efficient tasks are identified to prevent each component from
developing its dominant failure causes (62). This identification of the optimal set of tasks
required to cope with all of the dominant failure causes represents the major endeavor not
yet adequately addressed by traditional RCM frameworks.
Computer-based decision support systems for Reliability Centered Maintenance
can be thought as the most assertive way to deal with such an issue.

According to

Kobbacy (1992), the introduction o f intelligent decision support systems (IDSS) can
greatly benefit the problem of maintenance optimization if such systems are designed to
accomplish the following main functional features (49):
1. access the history data from a company’s maintenance database;
2. check the quality of data;
3. recognize data patterns;
4. query the user for additional information, judgment, criterion, etc.;
5. select the most suitable model for the analysis o f the data;
6. estimate model parameters;
7. select and optimize the model to provide an evaluation o f the current and
proposed optimal maintenance policy;
8. present the results in a flexible format, including a recommendation for the
future maintenance policy and a comparison with current practice;
9. respond to user inquiries, perform ‘what if?’ modeling and provide
explanations of decisions; and,
10. self-leam and enhance the knowledge base.

9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1.3 Objectives o f the Research

The main purpose of this research was the development o f a knowledge based system
which could provide a new, more efficient RCM framework. The developed system was
intended to be intelligent in the sense that it fulfilled some of the main functional features
described in Section 1.2. Therefore, the specific objectives of the current research can be
summarized as follows:
1. Identify the most commonly used equipment items within a specific
process industry, and catalog their functions and significant failure modes.
2. Identify and catalog most common human failure modes.
3. Develop a rulebase for automating the conversion of system schematics (in
a CAD-type software) to a functional system specification.
4. Develop a rulebase for identifying individual failure modes and system
failure modes relevant to the functional system specification.

10
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Computer and manual search of the literature revealed the existence o f dozens of journal
articles related to computer systems for maintenance applications.

However, the

literature referring to the use of expert systems for assisting reliability management
functions is very limited. The literature on the development of supporting maintenance
software such as knowledge-based systems for RCM and other PM functions is reviewed
here to illustrate the nature of the progress made in this field during the last decades.
Literature on the techniques and methodologies to be employed in the development of the
proposed system is discussed in Chapter 3.
2.1 The Need for Integrated Management to Improve Maintenance Tasks

Most of the software recently developed to support maintenance operations have come as
a response to the increasing urge that industrial managers have for integrating equipment
reliability and process safety management programs with preventive maintenance and
probabilistic risk analysis methods to minimize the occurrence of unscheduled
shutdowns.

According to Ian S. Sutton (1995) from Fluor Daniel Inc.. through the

integration of preventive/reliability maintenance methodologies, such as RCM. and
process safety management programs with probabilistic risk assessment, managers can
improve their facilities’ uptime. This integrated model provides a means for eliminating
duplicated systems, coordinating reliability revisions, and ranking projects according to
risk reduction criteria, which leads to reliability/safety programs that cost-effectively
meet the organization’s safety, environmental and operability goals (100).
11
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The development o f such integrated programs in large industrial organizations
implies inherent difficulties in the execution of individual PM functions or subsystems
that must handle massive amounts of history data and computations, and whose results
must be evaluated, grouped and reconciled to produce an integrated effort. As a response
to this difficulty, several distinct conventional computer software packages have been
recently developed to facilitate the maintenance management

processes.

Table 2.1

depicts a summary of commonly used computer maintenance packages, presented at the
1993 Maintenance Information Systems Survey.
2.2 The RCM Methodology

RCM has been in practice for almost four decades; however, the available literature on
RCM applications and breakthroughs show that its basic framework and implementation
methodology has remained unchanged through the years, focusing most of the new
developments on the design of computer software that can facilitate its introduction to
distinct operational settings (26, 35, 57, 93, 95, 112).
According to the literature, the RCM approach can be considered as a process
consisting of four major steps: (a) analysis and definition o f the system’s functions and
particularities, (b) failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), (c) prioritization of failure
modes, and (d) selection of suitable maintenance strategies for individual failure modes.
2.2.1 Systems A nalysis

The main difference between RCM and other reliability management techniques is the
fact that RCM recognizes that the most important aspect of the maintenance effort is the
preservation of a system’s function, not the condition of the equipment (95). Therefore,

12
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Table 2.1
Computer Software Applications to Maintenance

Software Name

Developer

Functionality

MANTRA

BMS Technology

A package for handling planned
and unplanned work such as safety
checks, quality routines, periodic
maintenance, and equipment
calibration. Moreover, it calculates
breakdown and records history.

COMPASS

Bonner & Moore

Real-time system which integrates
material inventory control, mainte
nance planning and scheduling,
equipment record history, preventive
maintenance, purchasing, and man
power accounting.

PEMICS

CGRAM Software

An integrated system which caters
for a company’s buildings, plant and
equipment maintenance. Among
others, it includes: breakdown and
corrective maintenance, capacity
planning and scheduling, planned
preventive maintenance and
condition monitoring.

EASE

COMAC Systems

A package designed to maximize
equipment reliability and to
minimize maintenance. It features
plant availability statistics, on-line
downtime monitoring, systems
integration, fault analysis with full
RCM functionality, real-time condi
tion monitoring, statistical process
control, and maintenance
management.

(table con’d.)

13
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Software Name

Developer

Functionality

MAIN/TRACKER

ELfCE Corporation

A fully integrated maintenance ma
nagement, cost tracking, parts inven
tory and purchasing system which
provides management control for
equipment and facilities
environments.

RCM Analyst

GasTops Ltd.

A software tool for RCM analysis
and data management. It handles a
wide variety of problems from the
failure modes, effects, and criticality
analysis of a particular machine sys
tem to the redesign of maintenance
programs for an entire plant. The
program uses a standard RCM logic
tree to categorized failure effects,
and select appropriate maintenance
tasks.

MAIMMAN

Hatton Parkinson Sys.

A computerized maintenance mana
gement system which includes sche
duling of inspections at irregular in
tervals, a warning where scheduled
maintenance is planned on items
which have recently been repaired,
and identification of items that are
incurring the most maintenance cost.

MLS

Largotim Business Solutions An integral environment for
maintenance planning, job control,
stores management, asset history and
cost analysis.

(table con’d.)

14
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Software Name

Developer

Functionality

IMPACT

Matrix Resource Ltd.

A software package which handles
a wide variety of planned and un
planned maintenance work. It pro
duces a complete plant history
through reports and graphs on activi
ties, cost and performance fault
analysis.

MAP

OSPREY Computer Services A system designed to assist in plan
ning and scheduling regular and
repetitive maintenance along with
breakdowns. The system provides
statistics on performance, failures,
reliability for analysis.

MAXIMO

PSDI Ltd.

A maintenance support package
that includes asset register, condition
monitoring, failure analysis, inven
tory control, labor resource, and
calendars.

15
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the first task in implementing an efficient RCM program is the systematically
examination of the system’s components to fully understand their individual and
combined functions and functional failures. According to Anthony Smith [1993], such an
systematic analysis involves five essential items of information:
1. System description
2. Functional block diagram
3. IN/OUT interfaces
4. System work breakdown structure
5. Equipment history
A well-documented system description is needed to record an accurate baseline of
the initial condition of the system’s components in order to identify system modifications
or upgrades which may require PM revisions, as well as critical design and operational
factors that might influence the degradation or loss o f the system’s functions.

The

functional block diagram (see Figure 2.1), which is an illustration of the major operations
that the system performs, represents a valuable tool for assisting the analyst in visualizing
the system functional structure. The addition of all IN/OUT interfaces to the functional
block diagram helps in observing and documenting the various elements that cross the
system boundaries, which may ultimately become a part of the functions that must be
preserved.

The system work breakdown structure (SWBS) is a compilation of the

components involved in each one of the functional subsystems shown on the functional
block diagram; the SWBS, along with the equipment history (a written recollection of all
component failures experienced over the past 2 or 3 years which require corrective
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Figure 2.1 A Typical Functional Block Diagram (93)

17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Temp.
status

maintenance) represent the primary source of information for identifying the failure
modes and failure causes associated with the corresponding corrective maintenance
actions (93).
2.2.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

The failure mode and effects analysis is a systematic method for examining all modes
through which a component failure can occur, as well as the potential effects of these
failures on the overall system, and their relative criticality in terms of safety and impact
on the normal functioning of the system (113).
In FMEA, the majority of failure modes are examined through two levels of
analysis: the system-level analysis and the component-level analysis, respectively. Such
analyses are carried out by system/component designers based on their expertise for
evaluating the component, system, and plant consequences induced by the individual
enlisted failure modes (88). The component failure modes and their effects are then
drawn up into a FMEA list as shown in Figure 2.2.
The FMEA matrix associates functional failures, and not equipment functions, to
the individual system components, since the reliability management actions devised by an
RCM program focus on avoiding potential functional failures and not on restoring a
previous equipment condition. Thus, the primary sources of information for constructing
an FMEA matrix are the equipment history file on individual component failure
occurrence, the expertise of engineers, technicians, and senior workers with hand-on
experience with the equipment, and the design diagrams or blue prints of the original
equipment manufacturer (93).
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C om ponent

M ode

E ffect

I. Switch A1

1.1 Fails open
1.2 Fails closed

1.1 System fails
1.2 None

2. Switch A2

2.1 Fails open
2.2 Fails closed

2.1 System fails
2.2 None

3. Light Bulb C

3.1 Open filament
3.2 Shorted base

3.1 System fails
3.2 System fails;
possible fire
hazard

4. Battery B

4.1 Low charge

4.1 System
degraded
4.2 System fails
4.3 System fails
by secondary
damage to
Light Bulb C

4.2 No charge
4.3 Over-voltage charge

Figure 2.2 A Simple FMEA
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2.2.3 Prioritization o f Failure Modes

“Not all failure modes are created equal.” One of the most fundamental differences
between RCM and other reliability management methodologies is the understanding of
such a powerful statement.

Organizations are limited in their resources, and thus,

emphasis must be devoted to each failure mode according to the potential impact of its
respective functional failures on the overall system’s performance.
The RCM process categorizes every failure mode into bins through the use of a
decision structure (93, 95). Logic tree analysis (LTA) is the name given in RCM to the
process of assessing the individual criticality rankings of failure modes. The basic LTA
uses simple yes-no questions which lead to the classification o f detected failure modes
into the following labeling bins: (a) hidden failures, (b) failure with safety-associated
consequences, (c) failures with minor to insignificant economical consequences, and (d)
failures with significant economical results. It should be noted that the traditional LTA
comprises only qualitative questions which do not involve any kind of statistical nor
mathematical evaluation (88, 93). This LTA query scheme has remained basically the
same from the time when the RCM methodology was introduced by United Airlines; and
as it will be discussed later, it might represent one of the areas with most potential for
improvement through the implementation of artificial intelligence techniques.
2.2.4 Selection of Maintenance Strategies for Individual Components

The final step in the RCM methodology is the devising of suitable maintenance strategies
or tasks for each of the examined failure modes. The selected maintenance tasks must be
both applicable and effective. By applicable it is meant that the tasks will prevent or
mitigate a recognized failure, detect an eminent one, or discover hidden equipment
20
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deterioration factors. By effective it is meant that the chosen tasks are the most costeffective alternatives among the competing candidates (93).
Thus, the preventive maintenance tasks implied by the conventional RCM
approach can be classified into the following four major categories:
1. Tasks oriented to the prevention of a potential failure.
2. Tasks aimed at detecting an eminent failure.
3. Tasks designed to protect a system’s normal functioning from hidden failure.
4. Tasks directed to the deliberate run to failure of a component due to economic
reasons.
2.3 The Quantitative Approach to Reliability Management

One of the most important objectives of an industrial reliability management program is
the development of maintenance policies or strategies that can lead to optimal decisions
regarding the following questions:
1. Where and when component replacement must take place.
2. Where and when inspection tasks are appropriate.
3. Where and when overhaul and repair actions are cost effective.

Mathematical models in the areas of operation research, statistical reliability, and
systems engineering have been developed as a response to the need for a rapid and
assertive evaluation of alternative maintenance decisions. The main purpose of such
models is to effectively assess the economic consequences of selecting one strategy over
the others, and by doing so, determine the most optimal decision (39). Furthermore,
mathematical models can maximize equipment availability through mathematical
21
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prediction of component failures. That is, a model can minimize equipment downtime by
determining when to repair or replace an item based on the Mean Time Between Failures
(MTBF) of crucial equipment components. Such mathematical computations have their
basis on the reliability theory (60).
2.3.1 The Notion of Reliability

Reliability can be defined as the probability that a particular system or component will
operate normally, according to certain working specifications, throughout a determined
period of time (20). During the life cycle of a component (the item’s repair-to-fail
process), its time to failure cannot be exactly predicted since it represents a random
variable characterized by the stochastic properties of the population of potential failure
times. Since the item’s failure time is a stochastic process, the probability of a failure
occurring before some specified time // is defined by:

(2. 1)

where f(t) is the component’s failure probability density function. Such an integral is
denoted by F(t) which represents the cumulative failure distribution function. It should
be clear that F(t) tends to one when t tends to infinity, which indicates that no item can
survive failure during an infinite interval of time (33).
The reliability (or survival function) is the complementary function of the
cumulative failure distribution F(t). Denoted by R(t), the reliability function represents
the probability that a component will survive at least to a determined time t, and is
defined as:
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Another concept originated from the reliability and failure distributions of a
particular items is its failure or hazard rate, denoted by h(t). The failure rate is defined as
the probability that a specific component will malfunction in the next interval of time
given that it has survived, without a failure, to time t. Mathematically, h(t) is determined
by (33):

(2.3)
The importance of knowing an item’s failure distribution, and so its reliability and
hazard rate functions, originates from the fact that decisions such as when to perform
preventive maintenance on a specific piece of equipment require information about the
time when its components will reach a breakdown state. Knowing the probability that a
failed state might occur at any specific time results essential in determining the costeffectiveness of alternative maintenance policies.
The failure distribution of equipment is generally obtained through curve fitting,
statistical analysis, and other numerical procedures performed on failure times
observations available from historical records. However, some probability distributions
such as the Weibull, negative exponential, normal and log normal distributions seem to
efficiently describe the failure frequency patterns presented by most industrial equipment
(20, 39, 60).
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2.3.2 Replacement and Overhaul/Repair Decisions Modeling

Replacement actions involve the substitution of working equipment before it reaches a
failed state at which its functioning is no longer remunerative. Since the failure time of
equipment is characterized by a stochastic process, the timing o f a replacement action is
also probabilistic.
When determining the time to perform a replacement, the minimization of the
total cost (replacement and operating costs) associated with the equipment’s operation is
usually intended. However, according to Jardine [1973], reliability management actions
should be given consideration only if the following two conditions are met:
1. The total cost of the replacement increases after the failure event.
2. The equipment presents an increasing failure rate.
The second condition is especially important. If a piece of equipment presents a
constant failure rate, replacement before failure will not affect its likelihood of failing
again in the next instant; thus, its preventive replacement becomes prejudicial in
economic terms.
In general, the model formulation tries to determine the optimal interval of time
between equipment or component replacements so that its total operation and
replacement cost per unit time C(tr) is minimized, that is:

C{tr) =

Total cost in interval f0.tT’)
Length o f interval

(2.4)

The complexity of the mathematical model varies according to the assumptions
considered in the analysis.

For instance, if it is assumed that the equipment can be
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replaced with an identical unit indefinitely, and inflation discounting is ignored, the
corresponding mathematical model that results is simple. Conversely, factors such as
repairs not returning back the equipment to its “as-new state”, potential technological
improvements, equipment breakdown during replacement intervals, and inflation
considerations can greatly increase the mathematical complexity of the subsequent
model. In that case, the model’s final result may not be a deterministic interval but rather
one with a stochastic nature (48).
2.3.3 Inspection Decisions Modeling

Equipment inspection is an essential part of any comprehensive reliability management
program, including RCM. Among other purposes, equipment inspection aims at (60):
1. Evaluating components in terms of potential problems.
2. Estimating the occurrence of a breakdown.
3. Scheduling repair actions to prevent a major failure.
4. Identifying key components that may precipitate a system’s failure.
Inspection can be thought as the middle point between preventive and corrective
maintenance. It applies to both deteriorating systems and hidden failures. Through the
mathematical formulation of inspection decisions, it is intended to determine an
inspection strategy that will produce the optimal balance between the cost of periodically
inspecting the equipment, and the potential loss production cost due to complete
machinery breakdown (48). Thus, the main goal of the formulation is the minimization
of the total cost {C(tj)) involved in inspecting the equipment until either a failure is
detected or the equipment reaches the failed state. C(tj) is then defined by the following
expression:
25
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C(t') =

Total expected cost per inspection cycle
Inspection cycle length

(2.5)

The total expected cost per inspection cycle is actually the sum of both the cost of
performing the inspection Cs, and the cost of a system failure per unit time Cf. It should
be noted that the model deals with an expected cost since the time at which a failure
precipitates cannot be deterministically calculated; thus, Cf can only be estimated
according to the failure function f(t) characteristic of the specific piece of equipment. As
in the replacement decision process, the inspection modeling effort depends on the
variables considered in the analysis. It can vary from very simplistic models based on
perfect corrective actions and constant inspection costs assumptions to more complex
ones where, for instance, the likelihood of a safety event (an event that requires a safety
system) is taken into account for the final decision (36, 48).
2.4 Approximate Reasoning in Reliability Management

Reliability analysis, equipment condition monitoring, and maintenance task scheduling
are fundamental parts of a reliability management program.

Traditional analytical

techniques developed to address issues such as mathematical and statistical models
require the knowledge of precise numerical probabilities and component functional
dependencies, information which is rarely available to industrial practitioners in real life.
The field of approximate reasoning can provide some guidelines for coping with such a
difficulty (105). Among inexact reasoning methodologies, fuzzy set theory is one of the
most widely used in describing the behavior of systems with inherent uncertainty.
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2.4.1 Fuzzy Set Theory

A fuzzy set differs from a traditional or crisp set in the sense that it does not have welldefined boundaries. In a conventional set A, the degree of membership 1 is assigned to
those objects that fully belong to the group, while 0 is assigned to objects that are not part
of the set. For instance, if A represents the set of integer numbers which are even, the
number 24 should then receive a membership value equal to 1, while 25 should have a
membership of 0 since clearly it does not belong to A. However, when dealing with
fuzzy sets, the assignment of membership values is not so trivial.
The fuzzy set theory is concerned with those subsets in which, due to their
inherent uncertainty, the transition between full membership and no membership for
objects in the universe is gradual rather than abrupt (40). As an example, if A is now
defined as the set of large integer numbers, intuitively, the number 1 should have a
membership value of 0 while number 10" a value of 1; but what about 20, or 70, or 110?
Evidently, they should receive membership values between 0 and 1. Fuzzy set theory
deals with the development of special functions required for determining the degree of
membership for objects belonging to fuzzy sets (46, 117).
The most commonly employed notation in the literature to denote the membership
function of a fuzzy set A is pA(44); that is:
j i a:

* - > [ 0 , 1]

(2 .6)

thus, for the previous example, the numbers 20, 70, and 110 could be thought as
belonging to the fuzzy set A (the set of large integer numbers) with membership degrees
of (iA= 0.2, pA= 0.4, and |aA= 0.6 respectively.
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In fuzzy set theory, there are three standard fuzzy set operations which are of
special importance. The standard complement, ~A, of afuzzy set A with respect to the
universe X is defined for all x<= X as:
I-U aC*)

H -a(*)=

moreover, given two fuzzy sets, A and B, their standard intersection,

(2-7)
and standard

union, pA^B, are defined for all x e X as:
= min[pA(x), pB(x)]

(2.8)

Ha^ bOO = max[pA(x), pB(x)]

(2.9)

where min and max denote the minimum and maximum operators, respectively (46).
For instance, if A and B are defined as (44):
A=
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2.4.2 Fuzzy Expert Systems

An expert system is a computer-based program which imitates the human reasoning
process of an expert while solving a particular problem. A fundamental component o f an
expert system is the inference engine, which is in charge of firing the rules contained in
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the knowledge base.

In a fuzzy expert system, the inference engine makes fuzzy

inferences from a set of production rules which consist of fuzzy predicates and fuzzy
prepositions (40, 46).
According to Zadeh [1983], an expert system must be capable of coping with
three potential sources of uncertainty: the fuzziness of premises and/or conclusions of
certain domain rules, the partial match between the premise of a rule and a fact supplied
by the user during a consultation, and the presence of fuzzy quantifiers in the premise
and/or conclusion of a rule. The use of fuzzy logic as a framework for dealing with
uncertainty in knowledge based systems has proven more effective and correct than
conventional techniques such as Bayesian inferencing and confidence factor analysis (40,
116).
In classical two-valued and multi-valued logics, a proposition, p, is either true or
false, or it may have an intermediate truth value from a finite or infinite truth-value set T.
Conversely, in fuzzy logic, a proposition is allowed to have a truth value ranging over the
fuzzy subsets of T. Thus, a fuzzy implication, T, is a function of the form:

T: [0,1] x [0,1]->[0,1]

(2 .10)

which defines the truth value, T(cr. b), of the conditional implication “if p, then q '\ given
that a and b are any possible truth values of the fuzzy propositions p, q, respectively.
Clearly, this function is an extension from the restricted domain (0, 1} of the classical
implication p —>q to the full domain [0, 1] of truth values in fuzzy logic.
Since the knowledge base of a fuzzy expert system consists of a collection of
fuzzy propositions representing the facts, and fuzzy conditional implications constituting
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the rules, multiple fuzzy implications are needed to assess the truth values of the encoded
heuristics. Such fuzzy implications are normally inserted into a decision table which
becomes part of the rule-based system. This fuzzy decision table provides a framework
for systematically representing and inferring information from an uncertain environment
when the expertise at hand involves imprecise rather than precise knowledge. It should
be noted that, although the mathematical formulation of a fuzzy implication should
uniquely and strictly depend on the nature of the expertise encoded in the corresponding
knowledge based system, it must be based upon well-founded and sound fuzzy set
operators. Dozens of different fuzzy logic algorithms have been developed for several
distinct applications throughout the years, and a vast number of them can be found in the
reported literature (40, 46, 116).
2.4.3 The Fuzzy Approach to Equipment Reliability and Maintainability

Although only a small number of scholars has seriously addressed the issue of how to
handle uncertainty in the area of equipment reliability and maintainability, the importance
of developing industrial reliability management programs that can cope with imprecise
equipment maintenance data can not be dismissed.
Fuzzy sets can be employed for representing equipment condition and remaining
life, predicting machine failures, performing component and risk assessment analysis, as
well as determining the frequency and timing of reliability management actions (79, 58,
84, 91, 92, 99, 105). Particularly related to this study are the efforts of representing
machine condition and system criticality through fuzzy sets. Equipment condition has
been modeled using triangular fuzzy numbers (99). If x is the fuzzy variable for the
condition of a particular machine (ie, x may vary from 0 to 10, being 0 a completely
30
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failed state while 10 a perfectly functioning state), then, the functional condition o f
machine B can be represented by the triangular fuzzy set:
\LB (x) = tri ( a , x, P)

(2.11)

which has equal spread on both sides, ie, x-a = P-x.
Moreover, Tomsovic and Baer [1996] have proposed the use of Zadeh’s fuzzy set
operations for modeling component dependencies. In RCM, for instance, it is necessary
to evaluate all the functional interrelationships among the system’s elements in order to
assess the overall effects of the distinct component failure modes. However, for large
systems, the nature of the dependencies may be unknown. Thus, fuzzy set operators,
such as conjunction and disjunction operators, may denote a natural and simple way of
representing the possibility of interdependencies among machines or pieces of equipment.
It should be noted that these fuzzy operators need to be carefully chosen or devised so
that the equipment interdependencies under scrutiny can be properly reflected in the
analysis.
Fuzzy logic has also been considered for manipulating the linguistic terms that an
analyst employs in performing a Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) (79). Linguistic variables can be adopted to describe the severity, frequency of
occurrence, and detectability of failure modes. Each one of such linguistic terms can be
represented by fuzzy trapezoidal numbers, as shown in Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. The
degree of risk associated to each failure mode can then be determined by a devised
arithmetical scheme involving the membership values deduced from the corresponding
trapezoidal numbers according to the analyst’s appreciation.

Finally, through a

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

defuzzification method or procedure, a conclusive linguistic variable (ie, moderate,
important, very important, etc.) can be resolved to determine the risk of each component
failure mode.
2.5 Intelligent Computer Systems and RCM

The selected software tools listed in Table 2.1 are considered maintenance management
systems in the sense that they provide an integrated environment for monitoring,
controlling, and coordinating maintenance operations with all other functional activities
of an organization such as process scheduling, purchasing, storing, and others. Although
the importance of such systems in promoting an efficient and orderly execution of
functions can not be ignored, they fail in delivering the appropriate technical and
analytical means for an effective RCM implementation.
RCM bases its efforts on the monitoring of individual pieces of equipment. The
most challenging aspects of its implementation is obtaining sufficient data on equipment
performance such as correlated errors, faults, breakdowns, and others measures of
degradation. The evaluation, grouping and comparison of such a massive amount of data
cannot be efficiently handled by a general information system in which global integrating
parameters are normally given greater importance. Furthermore, in RCM, for different
types of components and machines, different types of maintenance policies are generated
which involves a variety of failures patterns. The analysis of such patterns demands
knowledge and training in using mathematical models not offered in a conventional
software. Finally, the maintenance engineer is highly challenged by the nature of the
information manipulated by an RCM. Certain specific operability details such as the
replacement of components with different specifications or maintenance policies impose
32
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special flexibility and versatility in the maintenance routines which makes difficult the
enhancement and evaluation of reliability management tasks by conventional integrated
computer systems (50, 57).
Nevertheless, knowledge based systems have been identified as a strong candidate
for handling systems such as RCM.

According to several scholars in the field, an

intelligent decision support system composed by subsystems such as expert systems and
embedded neural networks represents the best alternative to improve the performance of
an RCM program. They claim that an intelligent supporting program can provide the tool
to integrate all RCM data and prevent decision makers from being overwhelmed by the
complexity of reliability management modeling and planning (47, 49, 50, 57, 88, 110).
Moreover, since an expert system matches human heuristic thought processes, the expert
systems methodology seems to be more acceptable to a maintenance engineer than the
solution of a computational algorithm or other analytical procedure (82).
2.6 Expert Systems Applications in Reliability Management

This section discusses the most relevant knowledge based systems developed during the
last decade for reliability management applications. Although these efforts did not yield
a system that could efficiently cover all the RCM features nor reconcile the mathematical
modeling with the heuristics aspect of reliability management, they do represent
breakthroughs in the conventional way of managing maintenance operations and confirm
the suitability of expert systems in supporting RCM functions.
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2.6.1 Automated Cable Expertise (ACE) (67)

One of the first reported efforts in creating an expert system for corrective and, in a sense,
some preventive maintenance tasks is the Automated Cable Expertise system, known as
ACE. It was developed by the AT&T Bell Laboratories in 1985 to analyze thousands of
customer trouble reports for signs of potential outside-plant problems.

ACE was

programmed using Franz Lisp and OPS4, and delivered on an AT&T 3B2/300 computer.
The systems uses two databases: CRAS, the Cable Repair Administrator System;
and TREAT, the Trouble Repair Evaluation and Administration Tool, whose analysis
guides local telephone companies’ preventive maintenance programs. The final output of
the system is a comprehensive report describing the place and nature of outside-plant
repairs that could improve the service to the customers and save the company money.
However, ACE was designed with the purpose of assisting in cable analysis only.
Its main objective is to identify the location where loop-cable analysis is needed. Thus,
ACE does not carry out any real important mathematical, or probabilistic risk analysis. It
makes its recommendations based on the encapsulated expertise of well-trained human
analyzers. Although ACE’s recommendations involves certain reliability management
strategies for improving the local cable configuration, they can be seen instead as mere
corrective actions, generated through coded human expertise without a serious
component failure mode analysis.
2.6.2 The SRI Program (88)

A Systematic Reliability Improvement (SRI) program was developed by the Toshiba
Corporation and the Tokyo Electric Power Company to support the decision-making
process of reliability management planning in nuclear power plants. The system is based
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on the Reliability Centered Maintenance methodology, and integrates the following three
subsystems:
1. The equipment part maintenance information control system (EMICS), which is
in charge of the evaluation of component reliability and aging parameters. The
maintenance management subsystem provides statistical analysis on component
failure modes.
2. The failure mode effects/criticality analysis database system (FMECA-DBS),
designed to classify the failure mode characteristics and their environment. The
FMECA database subsystem manages data on the system/component failure
modes, previously estimated by experts at the design stage.
3. The PM planning subsystem which determines the priority of PM improvement
plans.

It evaluates the priority or criticality of PM actions such as improved

maintenance, design, quality, and operation for components and their parts through
an interactive logic tree analysis.
This last subsystem represents an intelligent knowledge based system designed to
provide improved maintenance guidance on PM intervals, tasks, and inspection
techniques based on the analyses yielded by the other two subsystems. However, the
system does not generate reliability management strategies based on inherent PM
expertise or mathematical models. It just upgrades the information-handling process of
traditional RCM relevant to the FMECA and logic tree analyses in order to compute the
priority for reliability improvements. The system can not make a decision by itself; it
needs the user to carry out the FME/CA ranking assessment, as well as to interpret the
final priorities given to the different PM policies. The literature is not clear about this
37
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point, it seems that the user follows the branches depicted in a displayed logic tree to
distinguish the most appropriate reliability improvement.

Moreover, although the

proposed SRI program handles some vague terms (i.e. “‘critical”,“highly critical”, etc.) to
perform the evaluation of the failure modes and prioritization of PM strategies, the
authors do not incorporate any fuzzy or approximate reasoning scheme to any o f the
system's modules, which may evidence a major incapability of the system in handling
such ambiguous variables.
2.6.3 An Expert System for FMECA (110)

Jonathan Webber from Dowty Fuel Systems has proposed and developed an expert
system to assist in failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). Although.
FMECA is just a part of the whole structure of the RCM methodology, it is worthwhile to
discuss such an expert system here since it represents a valuable effort in proving the
effectiveness of artificial intelligence in PM functions.
According to Webber, FMECA’s primary contribution is the early identification
of potential failures so that they can be eliminated early in the design stage. However, the
traditional FMECA activity is unable to influence design since the time that it takes to
carry it out often exceeds the development phase. The FMECA methodology consists of
three major steps: the system interpretation, the failure analysis, and the numerical
analysis. Webber proposes that by automating the failure analysis through a knowledge
based system, the FMECA duration time is then reduced, which greatly improves its
effectiveness. To prove his point, he constructed an expert system for failure analysis on
a hydraulic actuation system. The developed expert system models the behavior of the
hydraulic fluid as it goes, under some specified conditions, through the diverse
38
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components of the actuator. Through the elicitation of relevant heuristics on the distinct
functions and failure modes of each one of the components, and the hydraulic line
between them, the expert software can know which components suffered from the effect
of an upstream failed component. The software then indicates if a normal liquid flow
between components was detected during the simulation, and provides the FMECA for
all the components of the actuator.
The results of this effort showed that the expert system carried out the failure
analysis in less than a quarter of the time previously taken by the human analyst. In
addition, the quality of the knowledge based failure analysis was superior over its human
counterpart when used with systems incorporating ten or more components.
2.6.4 IMOS (49)

IMOS, a prototype intelligent maintenance optimization system was developed to assist
in the evaluation and enhancement of maintenance routines. This system shows a very
interesting configuration where an optimization module for PM routines is combined with
a model-selection knowledge base. The main objective of the optimization module is to
determine the interval of time at which preventive maintenance is to be performed, based
on one of the following optimizing criteria:

maximization of equipment availability,

minimization of maintenance cost, minimization o f maintenance costs while meeting
availability requirements, or maximization of profit.

Conversely, the model-selection

knowledge base consists o f nine rules (see Figure 2.6) constructed to identify the most
appropriate mathematical model to be applied according to the characteristics presented
by the particular situation.

There are five basic models coded in the system:

the

deterministic model, the stochastic model, the geometric model I, the geometric model II,
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and the Weibull analysis model. IMOS represents an innovative PM framework in the
sense that it attempts to reconcile maintenance-routine optimization models with PM
heuristics drawn on the expertise of experienced maintenance engineers. However, the
simplicity of the system reduces its effectiveness. A formal failure mode effects and
criticality analysis is absent from the prototype system. IMOS concentrates its efforts in
determining only the most appropriate PM interval for isolated machines or components
without evaluating the environment surrounding the failures; and even the computation of
such an interval is based on very simplistic criteria. Furthermore, the system was not
designed to consider components with variant or complex reliability functions, which
causes it lack of the flexibility and versatility required for RCM applications.
2.7 Literature Search Summary

The results of the literature search clearly show the increasing interest in the utilization of
intelligent knowledge based systems for reliability management operations.

Such

systems can considerably improve the scope o f reliability centered maintenance
applications.
Nevertheless, most of the reported systems fail in providing a comprehensive
RCM framework that can take full advantage of both exact optimization models, and PM
expertise recollected in the form of rules. Systems such as the SRI program and IMOS
represent a significant step to the development of the ultimate RCM software. However,
there are techniques such as fuzzy induction, and approximate or inexact reasoning that
can positively contribute to the field of reliability management but have not yet been
seriously considered by most researchers.
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RULE 2

RULE 1

If N um ber o f PM events is large
and N um ber o f failure events is sm all
and PM cy cle is not very variable
Then
A pply Geometric M odel II

If
Num ber o f PM events is large
and N o failure events
and PM cycle length is not very variable
Then
Apply Geometric Model I
RULE 4

RULE 3
If Num ber o f PM events is large
and There are sufficient failure events
and PM cy cle length is very variable
Then
A pply Deterministic M odel I

If N um ber o f PM events is very sm all
and N um ber o f failure events is enough
and W eib. P parameter is o f CO dist. > I
Then
A pply Weibull M odel

RULE 5
If
Num ber o f PM events is very small
and Num ber o f failure events is sufficient
and Weib. p parameter o f CO dist. not > 1
Then
Stop any PM policy, report beta value

RULE 7

RULE 6
If Num ber o f PM events is large
and Num ber o f failure events is large
and W eibull p parameter o f PM dist.= l
and W eibull p parameter o f CO dist.= l
Then
A pply Stochastic M odel

RULE 8
If N um ber o f PM events is large
and There are failure events
and Weib. p parameter o f PM dist. not = I
or Weib. P parameter o f CO dist. Not = 1
and PM cycle length is sufficiently variable
Then
A pply Deterministic M odel

If
Num ber o f PM events is large
and Num ber o f failure events is large
and W eib. p parm. o f PM dist. not =1
or
W eib. P param. o f CO dist. not =1
and PM cycle length is not variable
Then
N o m odel is suitable - explain

RULE 9
If N one o f the above rules is successful
Then
N o m odel can be applied - explain

Figure 2.6 Model Selection Ruiebase for Prototype IMOS (49)
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE

3.1 Overview

The primary objective o f the developed PC-based system is to automate the
implementation of RCM through the integration o f distinct techniques which have been
postulated by experts in the field as noted in the published literature. This knowledge
encapsulation process had to be carried out systematically to consider all of the different
key factors in the analysis. Therefore, the first step in addressing this problem consisted
of an exhaustive literature search to determine the most suitable mathematical and
heuristic PM approaches to be consolidated into the system. This library research also
provided valuable insights for developing fuzzy reasoning mechanisms to be included
into the inference engine of the created system. From this analysis, the initial set of
inference rules were constructed, the system architecture defined, and the user interface
requirements identified. The formal knowledge representation was then translated into
the selected development tool. The final step of the project implied the assessment and
evaluation of the system’s performance as an effective RCM management tool.
3.2 Scope of the Research

The main purpose of the completed study was the development of a computer-based
expert system to assist in RCM applications. Mainly, the system was designed to provide
the industrial practitioner with an availability structure model of his process machines,
which represents the foundation of the component risk assessment analysis.
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The success of an RCM program greatly depends on the assessment o f the
multiple functional interdependencies among the individual system’s component failure
modes, as well as their corresponding criticality analyses. If the analyst lacks sufficient
expertise for uncovering such component dependencies, the resulting RCM effort will be
incapable of revealing critical factors or circumstances that if not properly considered in
the analysis, make the development of a comprehensive and effective equipment
maintenance program impossible. Nevertheless, for large industrial systems where the
degree of complexity is such that most analysts can not conceive of all the distinct
component interdependencies, an intelligent computer system with relevant knowledge
on the system’s functional characteristics would represent an important tool for
constructing the required availability structure model.
The scope of this work focused on the development of a prototype expert system
which could implement the RCM framework, using the chemical process industry as the
application area.
3.2.1 The Chemical Process Industry

Chemical processes play a critical role in human society since they represent one o f the
most important manufacturing activities. The importance of this type of industry is easy
to visualize- chemical products are everywhere. According to the literature, the chemical
industry uses the greatest amount of engineering techniques and equipment among all
industrial disciplines (98); therefore, it represents an appropriate application area for
reliability management methodologies such as RCM.
The Office of Statistical Standards defines chemical and allied products as
comprising three general classes o f goods (66);
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1. basic chemicals such as synthetic fibers, plastic materials, dry colors and
pigments,
2. finished chemical products to be used for ultimate consumption as drugs,
cosmetics, and soaps, and,
3. materials or supplies in other industries such as paints, fertilizers, and
explosives.
Although, the manufacturing processes followed in the production of such items
involve a wide variety of chemical procedures (ie. crystallization, evaporation,
distillation, etc.), they are usually very similar and often only few variables are altered.
Hence, since related engineering principles or techniques are usually applied, most of the
manufacturing equipment used in different chemical plants ends up being very similar, if
not identical.
Equipment maintenance is a key issue in this type of industry.

Chemical

processes are characterized by tight operational specifications which are clearly
dependent upon the normal functioning of the different machines, thus, equipment
reliability becomes a crucial factor in the overall process planning function.
Chemical engineers commonly use computer aided design (CAD) software to
design, control, and monitor their industrial processes. Among such packages, ASPEN
Plus, from Aspen Tech, has been adopted by leading chemical process companies, such
as Dow, BASF, DuPont, and Exxon, as the industrial standard for the designing, and
monitoring of chemical manufacturing systems. This package aims at the improvement
of chemical operations by assisting the user in three major areas: process layout,
equipment trouble shooting, and equipment design and rating capabilities. ASPEN Plus
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is controlled through a graphical interface which allows the user to model a process by
creating a process flowsheet, and then specifying the operating conditions (temperature,
pressure, etc.) for each one of the system components. Once a base model for the process
is specified, the user can run a simulation of its functioning, and perform a what-if
sensitivity analysis to evaluate the effects of different operating scenarios. ASPEN Plus
also assists the user in equipment cost estimation, process economic evaluation, and
process optimization.

This software is equipped with special modules for specific

applications such as a petroleum and distillation enhancement subsystem, and an
electrolytes expert system. At any time, the user can export the process flowsheet and
layout drawings to a design program such as AutoCAD or any other CAD package (as a
PXF file), or the equipment operating data and process simulation results to a computer
spreadsheet ( as a LOTUS file).
3.2.2 The New RCM Framework

This research was oriented to the development of a new automated RCM framework that
ultimately can be viewed as a component of a new innovative computerized equipment
maintenance environment.

Figure 3.1 depicts the intended reliability management

environment, whose final goal is the generation of optimal equipment maintenance
strategies according to the type of manufacturing process and operating conditions of the
plant.
Normally, chemical processes are highly complex. Their design, development,
and control involve such a vast effort that engineers must use sophisticated computer
software. In order to facilitate and minimize the user data input and intervention, the
conceived maintenance environment directly utilizes the equipment condition and
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operational data generated by ASPEN Plus as the main input for the RCM module. This
module is embodied by the developed expert system, which generates the Availability
Structure Model to be utilized by a Statistical Data Analysis Module.
The RCM component involves the accomplishment of three major tasks. First,
the RCM module interfaces with ASPEN Plus and is able to recognize the distinct pieces
of equipment and type of chemical process under analysis. Second, it determines all the
different failure modes associated with the involved manufacturing equipment, how they
may affect each other, and how they may obstruct the normal functioning of the overall
system. Finally, the RCM module generates an availability structure model that could
serve as the basis of the risk assessment analysis needed for determining the most
beneficial equipment maintenance actions and strategies for the plant.
Figure 3.2 shows an example availability structure model. Such a model consists
of a special type of reliability diagram or network which not only depict the different
interdependencies among the system’s components, but also depicts associated
equipment maintenance times (outside the scope of this study) as well as relevant data on
how to handle possible failures of individual pieces of equipment. The main function of
an availability structure model is to provide a framework for analyzing distinct failure
scenarios via Monte Carlo simulation.

Thus, a comprehensive availability structure

model should include the following:
1. What should and should not be expected when a specific component fails?
2. How is the safety and normal operation of the plant affected when the
component fails?
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Figure 3.1 A Proposed Industrial Equipment Reliability Management Environment
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3. What can and can not be done while maintenance is performed on the
component?
4. For how long can the production process remain stopped, while the
component is being repaired or replaced, without experiencing any
considerable production loss?
5. What sort of immediate actions must be taken upon the occurrence of the
failure?
3.3 The Knowledge Engineering Phase
3.3.1 Process Selection

The first step in the development of the expert system was the selection of a set of
representative industrial chemical processes that could be used for extracting the needed
equipment maintenance expertise.
Ten industrial process were selected on the basis of commercial importance.
According to the 1992 Survey of Industrial Chemistry (14), the following (presented in
order of importance) are the most produced industrial chemicals in the world; and hence,
their production processes were taken as the main sources of the expertise used in this
research.
3.3.1.1 Sulfuric Acid; H2S 0 4

Ninety nine percent of sulfuric acid is produced through the Contact Process, which was
developed in England in 1831. In a Contact plant, sulfur and oxygen are burned to SO, at
1,830" F, and then cooled to 788 "F. The SO, and 0 2 then enter a converter containing
four layers of catalyst, usually vanadium in the form of individual pellets. About 65% of
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Actions
-Stop system while repairing
-When leaking, replace battery with a new one
-Recharge it otherwise

Actions - Maintenance Times - When Fails

(same as A2)

............V*'
Actions
-Stop system while repairing
-If corroded then replaced
-If blades are bent then examine motor

Switch

Fan

Battery
Maintenance Times ^ .
-Replaced each year I
Maintenance Times
Inspect every 6 months

When Fails (Risk = 20%);
-System Fails
;
-Toxicitv hazard
I

\ When Fails (Risk = 60%)
j-System fails
;-Switches may be damaged
;-User can be hurt

Switch

Actions
-Replace switch with a new one
-Keep system working
-Keep working area free of water spills

Maintenance Times
;-Inspect every 3 months
; for short circuits

When Fails (Risk = 35%)
;-Nothing if AI is functioning OK
I-Small electric shock hazard

Figure 3.2 A Simple Availability Structure Model
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the S 0 2 is converted to SO, in the first layer with a 2 to 4-second contact time. The gas
which leaves the first layer at 1,112 ”F is cooled to 752 ’ F and enters the second layer of
catalyst. After the third layer about 95% of the SO, is converted into S 0 3. The mixture is
fed to an initial absorption tower, where S 03 is hydrated to H2S 0 4 with a 0.5 to 1% rise in
acid strength in the tower. The mixture is then reheated to 790' F and enters the four
layer of catalyst which gives overall a 99.7% conversion o f SO, to S 0 3. The gas is
cooled and then fed to a final absorption tower where it is hydrated to H2S 0 4 (14. 21, 23.
45).
3.3.1.2 Nitrogen and Oxygen; N2, 0 2

There are three fundamental steps in the production of oxygen and nitrogen from the
liquefaction of air:

purification, refrigeration, and rectification.

Purification is the

removal of dust, water, vapor, carbon dioxide, and hydrocarbon contaminants through an
oxidation chamber. Refrigeration in an oxygen plant means cooling the compressed air
(at approximately 77 psi) until it becomes a liquid at about 310 ’ F below. Rectification is
the separation of liquid air into its components, oxygen and nitrogen by repeated
distillation (14, 16, 55, 65).
3.3.1.3 Ethylene and Propylene

Most ethylene and propylene is made by the thermal cracking, sometimes called steam
cracking of hydrocarbons at high temperatures with no catalyst. The feed streams (ethane
and propane) are first mixed with steam and then cracked in separate furnaces at
temperatures ranging from 1,150 to 1,500 *F. The combined effluents are water-scrubbed
and cooled to 100°F to condense polymers and aromatics.

Ethylene and lighter

hydrocarbons are removed in a fractionating column called deethanizer, and leave in the
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overhead product stream.

The bottom stream contains propylene and higher

hydrocarbons. Recovery of the ethylene is carried out by cooling the overhead stream to
about -195 *F and treating the condensed liquid in another fractionating column called a
demethanizer.

The bottom product from the demethanizer is fed to an ethylene

fractionator for purification.

Recovery of the propylene involves treatment of the

bottoms from the deethanizer in a depropanizer (another fractionating column) and a
propane splitter (14, 64, 81, 89, 98).
3.3.1.4 Calcium Oxide or Lime; CaO

During the production of lime, limestone is crushed and screened to a size of
approximately 4 to 8 in. The limestone then passes through a kiln which in most cases is
a gas-fired upright kiln where the stones bum at different rates according to their sizes.
Once the lime product leaves the kiln, it is cooled in rotary air-fluidized cylinders, and
sent to a slaker if slaked (Ca(OH)2) is desired (14, 66, 85).
3.3.1.5 Ammonia; NH3

Ninety percent of ammonia plants generate the hydrogen required for the ammonia
manufacture by steam-reforming of natural gas. Desulfurized natural gas is fed with
steam to a primary reformer, where it is reacted with steam in Ni-catalyst-filled tubes.
The reformed gas and steam are then cooled to 700" F. This cooled gas-steam mixture
enters a two-stage shift converter where iron and cooper catalysts are employed to obtain
raw synthesis gas. This synthesis gas, after being purified in C 02 absorbers and strippers,
is then compressed in a two-case centrifugal compressor. Interstage cooling is provided
by heat exchange with methanator feed, cooling water, and NH3 refrigerant. Anhydrous
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ammonia is catalytically synthesized in a loop in which unconverted gas is recycled for
eventual conversion to ammonia (14, 16, 55, 108).
3.3.1.6 Phosphoric Acid; H3P 0 4

By 1989, 91% of the world‘s production of phosphoric acid was made by the Wet
Process. In this process, the phosphate rock is ground and mixed with dilute H3P 0 4 in a
mill. Then, the mixture is transferred to reactors where H2S 0 4 is added. The reactors are
heated to around 175°F for 4 to 8 hours.

Air cooling carries the HF and SiF4 side

products to an absorber tower which transforms them into H2SiF6. Filtration o f the solid
gypsum (CaS04 2H20 ) from the reactors gives the final dilute H3P 0 4 solution (14, 64. 65,
89).
3.3.1.7 Caustic Soda and Clorine; NaOH, CL,

In 1892 the electrolysis of brine was discovered as a method for making both sodium
hydroxide and chlorine. This rapidly grew in importance and since the 1960s it has been
the only method of manufacture.

In the electrolytic process, the brine (25% NaCl

solution) is first purified, and then sent to an electrolytic cell where Cl, and H, are
precipitated. Two types of cells are commonly used, the diaphragm cell used now in 78%
o f all production plants, and the mercury cell which is employed in 19% of the plants.
Evaporation and filtration of the basic solution after electrolysis yields a solid salt, which
can be recycled, and an industrially 50% caustic soda solution (14, 66, 81, 108).
3.3.1.8 Sodium Carbonate or Soda Ash; Na2CO}

Although during the last years there has been a tremendous conversion from synthetic to
natural soda ash consumption, the Solvay method for manufacturing soda is still very
popular world wide. Sodium carbonate is made from a NaCl brine that is mixed with
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ammonia in a large ammonia absorber. A line kiln is also employed as the source of
carbon dioxide, which is mixed with the salt and ammonia in carbonation towers to form
ammonium bicarbonate and finally sodium bicarbonate and ammonium chloride. After
filtration, the sodium bicarbonate is heated to 350' F in rotary dryers to produce light
soda ash. Dense soda ash, used by the glass industry, is manufactured from light ash by
adding water and drying.

Normally, the ammonium chloride solution goes to an

ammonia still where the ammonia is recovered and recycled (14, 45, 64, 81, 89).
3.3.1.9 Nitric Acid; H N 0 3

In the latter years, nitric acid is only manufactured by direct oxidation of ammonia. A
high-pressure process is most often used where the ammonia is fed to a reactor containing
a rhodium-platinum catalyst at 1,380 to 1,690" F and 100 psi. From the reactor, a mixture
of NO and 0 2 is cooled, and transferred to an absorption tower with water and air to
oxidize the nitric oxide and hydrate it to around 65% nitric acid in water. This nitric acid
solution is later concentrated in a silicon-iron or stoneware tower containing 98% sulfuric
acid which yields, as final products, 90% nitric acid off its top and 75% sulfuric acid as
its bottoms (14, 55, 65, 89).
3.3.1.10 Ammonium Nitrate; NH4N 0 3

Although the basic reaction is the same, the manufacture of ammonium nitrate greatly
varies from plant to plant.

Crystals, granules, and prills are made with the same

chemistry but different engineering. In this study, the prilling technique was adopted. In
a stainless steel reactor, a mixture of NH3 and 60% N H 03 is concentrated to 85% nitrate.
Posterior vacuum evaporation at 260 to 285 ° F further concentrates the solution to 95%.
This hot solution is then pumped to the top of a spray or prilling tower 195 to 230 feet
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high. It is discharged through a spray head and solidifies as it falls in the air to form
small spherical pellets of 0.08 in diameter. The prills are screened, further dried, and
dusted with clay to minimize sticking (14, 16, 55, 85, 89, 98).
3.3.2 The Pieces of Equipment Considered in this Study

From the previously mentioned chemical processes, sixty two different industrial process
machines were identified, and their most relevant failure modes extracted from the
pertinent literature and field experts.

Appendix A shows these sixty two pieces of

equipment as well as their corresponding failure modes. Nevertheless, for the
development of the expert system, a subset of eleven of such machines was selected on
the basis of extent of use in the industrial settings. The eleven pieces of equipment
selected are the following:
•

Burner

•

Centrifugal Blower

•

Centrifugal Pump

•

Compressor

•

Converter

•

Distillation Tower

•

Evaporator

•

Heat Exchanger

•

Pipeline

•

Reactor

•

Waste Heat Boiler
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3.3.2.1 Burner

The type of chemical burner considered in this research is a full-cone spray burner
provided with a low-pressure air-atomizing nozzle. This type of burner has a maximum
fuel atomizing capacity between 30 and 35 short tons a day, and it requires between 550
and 750 std. ft3 of air per minute at a maximum pressure of 4 psi.
As it can be seen in Figure 3.3, the burner consists of three major components; a
centrifugal pump, a centrifugal blower, and a combustion chamber.

The combustion

chamber is made out of a 3/8 in. steel plate lined with 4 lA in. insulating and 9 in. fire
brick. Its internal production volume is estimated to be between 20 and 25 ft3/short ton a
day. The spray nozzle is assumed to be of carbon steel.
3.3.2.2 Centrifugal Blower

Figure 3.4 depicts the type of centrifugal blower assumed in the construction of the expert
system. It represents a centrifugal blower capable of developing pressure between 1 and
4 psi. It has a steel housing and stainless steel wheel with rubber internal seals. This type
of blower has a maximum capacity between 8,000 and 11,000 ft3 per minute, which
implies a 100 to 250 hp blowing motor.
3.3.2.3 Centrifugal Pump

Single-stage, enclosed impeller centrifugal pumps represent the type of pumps considered
by the developed expert system. This kind of pump can discharge between 100 and 300
gallons per minute with a total head (discharge head plus suction head) of 225 to 650 feet,
and a maximum speed between 3,000 and 4,500 rpm.
The common dimensions for a medium single-stage pump imply a 1lA to 3 lA in
suction diameter, a 1 to 3 in. discharge diameter, a 5 to 7 in. impeller diameter, and a lA to
55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3A in. impeller width. Their casings and impellers are most frequently made out of cast
iron, the shaft and wearing rings of stainless steel, and the mechanical seals of carbon
resin and nitrile. A single-stage, enclosed impeller pump is shown in Figure 3.5.
3.3.2.4 Compressor

The expert system was designed to handle medium-sized multistage centrifugal
compressors. As it can be seen in Figure 3.6, this type of compressor has 3 to 5 stages
made out of stainless steel impellers, shafts, and diaphragms.
The maximum inlet capacity for the type of compressors considered in this project
is between 20,000 and 30,000 ft3 of gas or air per minute, which implies a 400 to 600 hp
driving motor.
3.3.2.5 Converter

The type of gas converter covered in this project is the four-stage fluidized-bed reactor
with two internal heat exchangers for gas cooling. Such a converter consists of a single
cylindrical cast iron shell, with chrome cast-iron catalyst supporting grids, and steel heat
exchanger tubes. The catalysts here assumed to be used in this type of converter are
platinized magnesium sulfate and vanadium oxide.
A medium-size range of converters has been adopted. Thus, the inside diameter
of the studied type of converter is around 6 feet, 12 feet high, 9 to 12 in. the depth of
catalyst on each one of the four shelves, and a catalyst load averaging 1,500 lb per tray.
Moreover, the converters are assumed to be equipped with internal heat exchanger tubes
of 1 to 2 in. of inside diameters in a 6 to 7 in. steel shell. Figure 3.7 depicts a typical gas
converter configuration used in the knowledge engineering phase of this project.
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Figure 3.3 Burner (24)

Figure 3.4 Centrifugal Blower (78)
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Centrifugal Pump (78)

Figure 3.6 Multistage Compressor (78)
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33.2.6 Distillation Tower

The two-bed packed distillation tower was adopted in this research. Such a column
consists of ceramic “Raschig” rings that allow the distillation of two products at a time
inside the column.

The tower is assumed to have an operational pressure ranging

between 250 and 350 lb/ft2, and its height are thought to be between 35 and 40 feet, with
an inside diameter of 4 to 6 feet.
Regarding the supporting bar grids inside the column, they were to be lA in thick
bars spaced l lA in from each other. Figure 3.8 illustrates the common structure of a
“Rashing”-ring packed distillation tower.
33.2.7 Evaporator

One of the most popular types of evaporators found in the industry is the forcedcirculation evaporator with external horizontal heating surface. This type of evaporator
consists of a centrifugal pump that circulates the fluid to be concentrated throughout the
apparatus, an external tubular heat exchanger which heats the circulating fluid with the
heat provided by hot steam running in its shell side, and a steel vapor head through which
the vapor of the solution is dissipated.
The developed expert system was designed o handle forced-circulation
evaporators with a vapor head of 10 to 15 feet of height, and 7 to 10 feet inside diameter.
Furthermore, the heating tubes were thought to have a length between 8 and 10 feet with
inside diameters ranging between 3A and 1 lA in. Figure 3.9 depicts a typical forcedcirculation evaporator.
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Figure 3.7 Converter (21)
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Figure 3.8 Distillation Tower (78)
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3.3.2.8 Heat Exchanger

Figure 3.10 shows a typical shell-and-tube heat exchanger. In this project, a two-pass,
floating-head, shell-and-tube heat exchanger was chosen as the standard for the
knowledge base of the developed system. In this type of exchanger, cold liquid travels
through the inside tubes while hot fluid, gas, or steam runs throughout the cover shell.
Usually, welded steel is used as construction material for the cover shell of the apparatus,
while stainless steel is the choice for the inside tubes.
The heat exchangers have between 80 and 200 tubes of nominal diameters
between 3/4 and 1lA in. with a 6:1 ratio of tube length to shell diameter.
3.3.2.9 Pipeline

There are literally hundreds of pipeline types employed in the chemical industry to
transport multiple kinds of fluids and gases. As it was impossible to address all of them
here; only pipelines for low pressure gas and low pressure fluid were considered in the
expert system.
For low pressure gas, it is assumed a pipeline of butt-welded wrought iron is used,
capable of standing pressures not exceeding 500 psi, and temperatures lower than 500 ° F.
Such a pipeline is lA to 3/8 in. thick and 3 to 6 in. of inside diameter, permitting a
maximum span of 15 to 21 feet between supports. For low pressure fluid, it is assumed a
ap-welded galvanized wrought iron pipeline, capable of standing a maximum pressure of
200 psi, and temperatures not higher than 450 ° F. The pipeline dimensions are the same
as the ones for the low pressure gas pipeline, although the permissible span between
supports was specified between 12 and 17 feet.
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Figure 3.9 Forced Circulation Evaporator (5)

Figure 3.10 Tubular Heat Exchanger (27)
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Regarding pipe support hardware and fittings, wrought iron brackets were
considered as roof and wall supports while brick pier support rollers as floor supports.
The pipe fittings were assumed to be screwed or flanged, made out of cast iron, and
capable of operating under pressures of up to 500 psi, and temperatures lower than
750 *F.

Figure 3.11 exemplifies the types o f pipe support hardware included in the

research.
3.3.2.10 Reactor

The batch, liquid-to-liquid, closed-vat with stirrer reactor illustrated in Figure 3.12
represents the class of reactors incorporated into the knowledge base of the expert system.
ASTM AS88 grade B steel is commonly used in the manufacturing of such reactors,
which have with 2 to 4 radial-bladed paddle agitators, capable of generating 50 to 100
rpm.
The reactor size considered here are between 7 and 13 feet high, an internal vat
diameter of 6 to 10 feet, a total length of the paddle impeller between 60 and 70% of the
inside diameter o f the vessel, and a blade width equal to one seventh of its length.
3.3.2.11 Waste Heat Boiler

Figure 3.13 depicts a kettle waste-heat boiler normally used in medium-sized factories for
water heating or steam generation. Such boilers consist o f stationary water contained in
the kettle while a hot fluid, heated by either liquid or gas, runs inside the tubes. Stainless
steel is generally used for both the shell and tubes of the boiler, which under normal
operating conditions can generate between 30,000 and 50,000 Ih/hr o f 100 to 150 psig
steam.
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Figure 3.11 Fluid and Gas Pipeline (70)

Figure 3.12 Closed Vat Reactor (78)
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Figure 3.13 Waste Heat Boiler (64)
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3.3.3 Data Recollection on Failure Modes

For each of the eleven chosen pieces o f equipment, their most relevant failure modes
were obtained as explained in the previous section. Pertinent literature was reviewed, and
human experts were consulted, when needed. The library sources used for information on
the different failure modes are listed in the references.
In general, the information can be divided into two major groups. The first type
of data was that related to the impact (at the local and system levels) of the specific
failure mode. The second type deals with the possible factors generating or precipitating
the failure mode in question.
3.3.3.1 Failure Modes Effects and Controls

Appendix B contains all the information regarding the local and system effects as well as
suggested controls for each one of the eighty failure modes identified in this research.
The local effects are those consequences associated with the failure of normal
functioning of the particular piece of equipment.

Such locals effects also cover the

likelihood or possibility of other failure modes (for the same machine) being precipitated
or aggravated by the failure mode in question. System effects deal with the consequences
at a global level, including the impact that the failure mode has on the functioning and
condition of nearby equipment as well as the quality of the final or intended product.
Other considerations such as noise and vibration contamination, as well as human hazards
are also included in the system effects. Finally, a list of potential preventive controls
such as visual inspection, and other specialized diagnosis tests were included in the study
to complement and enhance the final report to the user.

67

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The local and system effects provide informative maintenance data to the
industrial practitioner, but also are critical criteria for the development of the failure mode
prioritization essential in any RCM program.
3.3.3.2 Factors Responsible for Failure Mode Precipitation

The most important, as well as the most time consuming, endeavor during the knowledge
engineering phase of this project was the identification of the factors thought to be the
most relevant causes for the precipitation and aggravation of each one of the eighty
failure modes considered by the developed expert system.
For each of the eleven machines covered in the study, the corresponding literature
sources were examined and reviewed in detail, distinguishing for every particular failure
mode three classes of precipitating factors:
•

Factors considered to have a critical effect in the development of the specific
failure mode. Those were named the “critical factors”.

•

Factors considered to have an important inherence in the development of the
specific failure mode. Those were named the “important factors”.

•

Factors considered to be somehow related to the development of the specific
failure mode. Those were named the “related factors”.

For any of the identified factors, critical, important, or related, proper limits were
established in order to assess the magnitude of their impact on the evolution of the
different failure modes. For instance, if for a multistage centrifugal compressor, the rotor
speed was found to be an “important” factor for the deformation of the compressor’s
thrust bearings, and lower and upper limits of 3,000 and 20,000 rpm were set
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respectively, it would then be implied that for rotor speeds below 3,000 rpm, no
significant impact on the thrust bearings should be expected while for speeds of 20,000
rpm or higher, a maximum impact on the deformation of the thrust bearings is certain.
All critical, important, and related factors identified in this research as well as
their corresponding magnitude limits are listed in Appendix C. The way in which that
information was used for predicting the likelihood of the precipitation of a particular
failure mode under determined working conditions is discussed in the following section.
3.4 The Mathematical Formulation of the System

After reading the process flow chart generated in ASPEN Plus, the expert system
performs two major tasks. It first evaluates all the failure modes involved in the different
machines of the process under scrutiny, detecting those that are likely to precipitate
according to the existing working conditions (called screening); and then prioritizes them
according to the risk that they pose to the system, the working environment, the
operators, and the product being manufactured.
3.4.1 Failure Mode Screening

The failure mode screening methodology developed during this research is based upon
the fuzzification of the effect of the precipitating factors shown in Appendix C. An
approximate reasoning algorithm, consisting of a fuzzy mathematical formulation which
relates the presence of one or more precipitating factors to the development of a specific
failure mode, was created to enable the inference mechanism of the expert system to
determine those failure modes that should be included in the final RCM analysis.
For each failure mode, three different types of precipitating factors were defined:
critical, important and related factors. A critical factor is a situation which impact on the
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development of a failure mode can be catalogued as determinant. A critical factor differs
from important and related factors in the sense that its full presence, that is when its
magnitude goes beyond its most extreme limit, guarantees the precipitation or
development of the related failure mode. An important factor is that whose contribution
in the development of the failure mode is substantial although not determinant. A related
factor, on the other hand, is a condition that has been identified with the development of a
failure mode, although its contribution can not be considered as significant.
All identified precipitating factors were expressed as trapezoidal fuzzy numbers
so that their contribution to the development of a particular failure mode of interest could
be quantified as fuzzy numbers between 0 and 1. Let f a be defined as the trapezoidal
fuzzy number representing precipitating factor a for a particular failure mode, then:

t
f a (x) =

<

0
if x does not reach the magnitude limits
mx + b if x lies between the magnitude limits
1
if x lies beyond the magnitude limits

(3.1)

where, .r is the current numeric value o f factor a, and mx + b denotes a linear equation
which increases from 0 to 1 as x goes from the less critical magnitude limit to the most
critical one.
Trapezoidal numbers of distinct shapes can be constructed from the fuzzification
of the different precipitating factors since the nature of the magnitude limits will
determine the slope of the resulting numbers.

For instance, if for a tubular heat

exchanger the following precipitating factors for “plugged or fouled tubes” have been
defined:
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Factor a : High temperature of shell substance {150' F to 800 *F}
Factor b : Low cross flow velocity on shell {15 to 3 feet/second}
Factor c : Acidity or basicity of shell substance {pH: 0 to 4 or 10 to 14}
then, the corresponding fuzzy trapezoidal numbers for factors a, b, and c in accordance to
their magnitude limits would be:

{

f a (x) =

^

{

f b (x) =

f c (x) =

^

J

ifx < =150 ° F
O.OOISx-O.23 if 150"F < x < 8 0 0 ’ F
1
if x >= 800" F

(3.2)

0
if x >= 15 ft/s
-0.083x+1.25 if 15 ft/s > x > 3 ft/s
1
if x <= 3 ft/s

(3.3)

0

-0.25x+l
0.25x-2.5

if 4 <=x <= 10
if 4 > x > 0
if 1 0 < x < 14
ifx = 0 orx = 4

(3.4)

As it can be seen in Figures 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16, the resulting trapezoidal numbers differ
in their basic shapes; however, their feasible values will always be between 0 and 1.
Having illustrated how the fuzzification of the different precipitating factors is
carried out, the approximate reasoning algorithm devised for screening a particular failure
mode according to its likelihood o f development is stated as follows:
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/. Evaluate all precipitating factors fo r the failure mode under scrutiny,
f ( x)factor i - according to the values given by the analyst. This would fuzzify
the effect that critical, important, and related factors have on the precipitation
o f the failure mode
2. Compute the following Likelihood Coefficient:
L C — wcr* Z f(x)factor i + wi m
V i = critical

f(x)factor j + wr e * £ f(x)factor k

V j = im p o rtan t

(3-5)

V k = related

where. wcr, wim> and wre are the selected weights fo r the critical, important,
and relatedfactors involved in the development o f failure mode i, respectively.
3. Compare the computed Likelihood Coefficient (LC) against the predetermined
threshold fo r failure mode i, Thrj

I f LC is greater than Thr[, then failure

mode i should be included in the final RCM analysis, otherwise, discard
failure mode i from the maintenance program.
It should be indicated that this failure mode screening algorithm is executed only
if all critical precipitating factors values are below their corresponding extreme limits.
That is, if one (or more) critical factor for a specific failure mode has reached or gone
beyond its most critical magnitude limit, the failure mode in question will be considered
to be worthy of being included in the final RCM analysis, making computation of its
Likelihood Coefficient unnecessary.
Regarding the weights for each type of factor, their selection should be consistent
with the nature o f the expertise being encoded in the knowledge base. For instance, for
the developed expert system, wcr, wim, and wre were defined as 3, 2, and 1, respectively,

72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fa(X)
1.00

0.00
150 ‘ F

400'F

6 0 0 *F

8 0 0 'F

1 0 0 0 'F

Figure 3.14 Fuzzification of Factor “a”

fb(x)
.00

0.00
3 ft/s

6 f/s

9 ft/s

12 ft/s

Figure 3.15 Fuzzification of Factor “b”
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15 ft/s

1.00

0.00

Figure 3.16 Fuzzification of Factor “c”
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since a critical precipitating factor was thought to contribute 1.5 times more to the
development of a failure mode than an important factor; and an important factor was
assumed to have a failure mode precipitating impact twice as big as that of a related
factor.
The threshold value for a failure mode should represent the minimum amount of
“evidence” that the analyst is willing to accept regarding the prompt manifestation o f the
failure mode. This “evidence” is directly associated with the magnitude of the impact of
distinct precipitating factors provoking the failure mode.

During this research, a

threshold value of 5 was selected for all the 80 failure modes considered in the
knowledge base.

This Thr value is equivalent to the evidence of a fully presented

if(x)factor = 0 critical precipitating factor, along with the full presence of an important
factor {wcr* f(x)factor / + w/m * f(x)factory = 3*1 +2*1 = 5). Although in this project
all Thri's were assigned the same value, this may not always be the case; and another
knowledge domain application may require the selection of distinct Thr values for
different failure modes.
To illustrate how this algorithm is applied by the expert system, the previous
example of the plugged or fouled tubes of a tubular heat exchanger is examined again, but
this time it is assumed that such a failure mode involves one critical precipitating factor,
two important factors, and one related factor as following defined:
Critical Factor 1: High temperature of shell substance {150' F to 800 ° F}
Important Factor 1\ Low cross flow velocity on shell {15 to 3 feet/second}
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Important Factor 2: High liquid viscosity on shell {100 to 700 SSU}
Related Factor I : Acidity or basicity of shell substance {pH: 0 to 4 or 10 to 14}
The fuzziciation o f critical factor 1, important factor 1, and related factor 1 were
given in equations 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, respectively. The fuzzy trapezoidal number for
important factor 2 is determined by the expression:

ifjc <= 100 SSU
0.0016x-0.16 if 100 SSU <x < 700 SSU
1
if x >= 700 SSU

0

fmp.fact.2 (x) =

^

(3.6)

Now, if during the consultation, the shell fluid was found to be at 300" F, traveling at 12
ft/'s. with a viscosity equal to 650 SSU, and a pH of 3; then the resulting Likelihood
Coefficient of the failure mode under analysis would be:
LC = wcr*f(x)factorj + wjm *(f(x)factor l +f(x)fact0r 2) + Wre*f(x)factor 1 O-L)
LC = 3 * 0.23 + 2 * (0.25+0.92) + I * 0.25
LC = 3.28
Since the computed value of LC is lower than the threshold value of 5, this particular
failure mode would not be included in the final system recommendation. Itshould be
clear that had the fluid temperature been 900 *F instead of 300 ° F, the failure mode would
have automatically been included in the final RCM analysis report without any further
computation since the shell temperature had been catalogued as a critical factor and
900 *F goes way beyond the critical magnitude limit of 800' F.
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3.4.2 Prioritization of Failure Modes

As was discussed in Chapter 2, not all failure modes are created equal, and this
understanding is what distinguishes

RCM

from other reliability

management

methodologies. The expert system carries out the prioritization of the failure modes that
pass the screening phase by assessing the overall risk involved in their precipitation. This
risk assessment analysis is not performed through the use of a decision tree as the
traditional RCM framework usually implies; rather, a fuzzy linguistic scheme was created
to combine practical expertise and possibility theory in the categorization of equipment
failure modes.
The impact of any failure mode can be evaluated from three different effect levels:
• The Local Level.

At this level, the consequences of a failure mode are

examined according to the repercussions on the normal functioning of the
machine suffering from the failure, as well as the possibility that other failure
modes could result in the same piece of equipment as a result of a chain effect.
• The Product Level. At the product level, a failure mode is analyzed on the
basis of how badly the product in process is affected by its development.
Here, global effects such as system shutdowns, working environment
conditions, and safety considerations become important issues at the time of
evaluating the failure mode since they have a direct influence on the quality of
the final product.
• The Secondary Failure Level. At this level, all possible repercussions in other
pieces of equipment are analyzed and evaluated.

There are two types of
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secondary failures, those that are related to nearby process machines, and
those that are associated with downstream equipment. Thus, when examining
secondary failures, it is of interest to assess all potential functional failures
caused by a particular failure mode in other pieces of equipment that are
placed upstream and downstream in the process arrangement.
The developed prioritization scheme was designed having in mind all these three
levels of effects, as well as the Likelihood Coefficient discussed in Section 3.4.1. The
local and product level effects can be determined directly from expertise withdrawn from
library sources and human experts since they are simply an estimate of how badly a
particular machine failure could affect its normal operation and the product being
manufactured. Regarding secondary failures, their assessment it is not as simple, since it
is not only necessary to know the nature of the damage that a specific failure mode could
have in related and nearby machines, but also the type and the physical arrangement of
the pieces of equipment upstream and downstream o f the machine presenting the failure.
The prioritization scheme involves the computation of the Priority Index for each
failure mode included in the final RCM analysis, that is, those that pass the screening
phase. The Priority Index (PI) is defined by the following expression:
P I —LI * LEI * PEI * SFI

(3.8)

where LI is the Likelihood Index, LEI is the Local Effects Index, PEI is the Product
Effects Index, and SFI is the Secondary Failures Index.
For this project, LI, LEI, PEI, and SFI were defined in such a way that each one of
them can take a value between 1 and 4. Therefore, the Priority Index of any failure mode

78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

can range from 1 (which would imply that the failure mode is just important enough to be
considered in the maintenance program of the plant) to 256 (which would indicate that
the failure mode is excessively critical and deserves all the possible attention and efforts
from the maintenance practitioner for its control or redesign).
3.4.2.1 The Likelihood Index

The Likelihood Index is simply a measure for comparing the threshold value {Thr) of a
particular failure mode against its Likelihood Coefficient. Thus, the Likelihood Index is
defined as:

LI = L C / Thr

(3.9)

In essence, the Likelihood Index indicates how many times the Likelihood Coefficient of
a failure mode went over its pre-established threshold value during the screening phase
included in the final maintenance program. As mentioned before, for this study a Thr of
5 was chosen for each one of the eighty failure modes considered in the knowledge base,
and since the highest possible LC turned out to be 20, in this particular application LI can
only take a value between 1 and 4.
3.4.2.2 The Local and Product Effects Indices

Both the Local and Product Effects Indices are obtained directly from the sources of
expertise. They are just a measure of the impact that a failure mode could have on the
specific machine where it originates and on the product.
Such indices were defined according to the following scheme: for a particular
failure mode, a LEI of I was assigned if its potential local effects were found to be small,
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a value of 2 if they were catalogued as considerable, 3 if they were thought to be large,
and 4 if they were regarded as extremely detrimental. The same scheme applies to the
PEI.
Appendix C depicts the assigned values for LEI and PEI for all eighty equipment
failure modes covered in this research. It should be stressed again that the assignment of
such values are entirely based on the expertise drawn from relevant literature (see
references). Therefore, the accurateness and validity of such indices depend exclusively
on the quality of the knowledge engineering phase.
3.4.2.3 The Secondary Failures Index

It is important to evaluate how a machine failure mode can impact other machinery
located nearby or downstream in the process flow.

The Secondary Failures Index

represents a means for doing that, by taking into consideration the given arrangement of
the production process, and the way in which the failure mode affects the involved pieces
of equipment.
In this research the SFI was defined as:

SFI = I + 1.5 * MaxNear + 1.5 * MaxDown

(3.10)

where MaxNear and MaxDown are indicators of the impact that the failure mode has on
nearby and downstream machines. Both of these indicators are determined according to
two important estimators: (1) the magnitude of the nearby or downstream failure mode
effects (NMS or DMS respectively), and (2) the nearby or downstream equipment
susceptibility to the failure mode effects (NES or DES). Thus, for a specific failure mode
MaxNear and MaxDown are determined by the following expressions:
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MaxNear = Max { NMS, * NESt}

(3.11)

V nearby machines i

and,

MaxDown = Max { DMS} * DESj}

(3.12)

V downstream machines j

A machine is considered to be nearby the current machine if they are attached to each
other with no pipeline between them. A downstream machine is that which immediately
follows the machine presenting the failure mode in the production process flow.
However, since ASPEN Plus does not provide any information about the production
process dimensions, a downstream machine that is connected to the equipment associated
to the failure mode by a pipeline will be assumed not to be affected by the failure mode
unless the effects of that failure mode are considered to be “flow transmitted”. In that
case, the expert system will “skip” the pipeline, and carry out the DMSj*DESj
computations for all pieces of equipment connected to the pipeline. Appendix E contains
the NMS, DMS, NES, and DES values assigned to each failure mode in relation to the
type of nearby or downstream machine. It is also specified in Appendix E which failure
modes have downstream effects that can be “pipeline transmitted”, and which do not.
The NMS, DMS, NES, and DES estimators were obtained directly from the
available expertise, and the assignment of their values was carried out according to the
following schemes:
•

For NMS and DMS:
0.00 if there is no nearby or downstream consequences for that failure mode
0.25 if nearby or downstream effects are small
0.50 if nearby or downstream effects are considerable
0.75 if nearby or downstream effects are large
1.00 if nearby or downstream effects are excessively critical
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•

For NES and DES:
0.00 if the nearby or downstream equipment is not affected by the failure
mode at all
0.25 if the nearby or downstream equipment is a little affected by the failure
mode
0.50 if the nearby or downstream equipment is considerably affected by the
failure mode
0.75 if the nearby or downstream equipment is largely affected by the failure
mode
1.00 if the nearby or downstream equipment is critically affected by the failure
mode

The next chapter discuses the engineering design and development o f the
computer knowledge based system that was constructed to implement and deliver the
RCM framework here described.
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CH APTER4
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPERT SYSTEM

This chapter discusses the software and hardware platform used in the creation o f the
RCM expert system, as well as the system design approach followed during the
implementation of the RCM framework explained in Chapter 3.
4.1 Knowledge Representation Paradigm

Once the information collected during the knowledge acquisition phase was reviewed and
logically organized according to the developed framework, it had to be represented
through the use of a paradigm embedded in the expert system.

There are several

paradigms that can be used to represent knowledge. Rules, frames or objects, networks,
and logical predicates are among the most widely used. Rules represent the most popular
of all representation schemes. They are If-Then statements which generate conclusions
once the validity of specific facts (premises) has been verified (6). A frame consists of a
set of slots that contains a group of specifications describing an object, action, or event
(38).

Semantic networks represent a group of nodes linked together to form object

relationships.

Predicate logic is a kind of formal logic which is used to make

generalizations about propositions based on specific relationships (6).
Nevertheless, although the developer may find a wide range of options, it depends
upon the nature of the knowledge involved which representation paradigm suits best the
system specifications.

The developed expert system was designed to access the

likelihood of occurrence for a predetermined set of failure modes. In essence, the system
is designed to store information associated with the precipitation of the failure modes
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involved in the process equipment under scrutiny.

Once each precipitating factor is

evaluated, the failure modes are screened through the use of an approximate reasoning
scheme. It is then that the final Priority Index is computed for those failure modes found
to be critical enough to deserve consideration.
Therefore, the system does not seek a specific goal or conclusion, as in the case of
most rule-based systems where rules have specific premises designed to lead the
reasoning process to one or another course o f action. It utilizes the information contained
in system classes (i.e. failure mode variables) to produce the final RCM output, which is
based upon mathematical and heuristic computations.
Since the intended application involved the processing of exhaustive information
on the relationship of equipment failure modes, causitive factors, and process
arrangement, mutually associated in a heterogeneous way, object oriented programming
was found to be the most appropriate paradigm. This does not mean that it was the only
knowledge representation mechanism that could have been applied to this project.
However, it proved to be efficient in satisfying the computing demands of this research.
4.2 Software and Hardware Platform
The constructed expert system was designed to work on a personal computer.

The

following reasons determined this decision:
1. Most companies utilize personal computers as a part of their office equipment.
Thus, no extra expenses will have to be made for implementing the system.
2. The IBM compatible PC version o f ASPEN Plus, the chemical process design
software that is integrated with the developed knowledge based system, is the
most commonly used.
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3. The PC environment makes the system portable.

It can be loaded onto a

Laptop or Notebook microcomputer and be taken to the floor shop or to
business strategy meetings.
4. PC-based systems can be developed in a windowing environment which made
the expert system very friendly, and increased the aesthetics of its screens.
Therefore, the prototype knowledge base system was delivered on an IBM
compatible Personal Computer with a Pentium processor, a base memory size o f 16 MB,
and a hard-disk space of 16 MB.
The software used in this project was selected on the bases of availability, and
versatility in addressing the system requirements. The selected support and application
software is listed as follows:
• Microsoft Windows 95
• LEVEL 5 Object release 3.6
• Microsoft Excel release 7.0
Since objects or frames constituted the chosen knowledge representation
paradigm for this project, an object-oriented expert system shell, or conventional or
symbolic language was needed to implement the system.
An expert system shell is a computer package capable of applying knowledge to a
problem domain. Thus, a shell is a “reasoning” entity containing an empty knowledge
base.

A conventional language is a programming language used in conventional

operating systems. It is designed to handle numerical operations only. On the other
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hand, a symbolic language has built-in features to aid in building expert systems. It is
primarily designed to handle symbolic processing computations (38).
In this research, a computer software shell was employed for the programming
tasks due to the following two major reasons:
1. The use of a software shell facilitates the programming process, allowing the
developer to spend more time on the knowledge engineering acquisition
phase.
2. Since the developed system represents the initial version, a rapid prototyping
approach was desired.
LEVEL 5 Object is an object-oriented tool with multiple inference strategies in a
flexible windowing environment.

It can be integrated with commercial software

programs, and all conventional programming languages. It was mainly chosen because of
its relatively low price, high quality graphics, and versatility in the processing of numeric
computations. Moreover, the graphical user interface of LEVEL 5 Object allowed the
importing of scanned bit-map files required for the graphical illustration needed in the
system.
LEVEL 5 Object was interfaced with Microsoft Excel to access the process
flowsheet data generated by ASPEN Plus.

An ASPEN Plus user can export his

application results as a Lotus 123 file, which can then be read by LEVEL 5 Object via
Microsoft Excel.
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4.3 System Architecture

Figure 4.1 depicts the architecture of the developed expert system. It consists of three
major components which were constructed on a modular basis: the database, the heuristic
base, and the output generator.
The database contains all the relevant information on the eleven chosen pieces of
equipment. The data included in the database cover the equipment characteristics, local
and system effects of each failure mode, their suggested controls, precipitating factors
and corresponding limits, as well as the assigned PEI, LEI, MMS, DMS, NES, and DES
values needed for carrying out the mathematical computations.
The heuristic base is in charge of compiling the input data originated from
ASPEN Plus, executing the problem-solving process of screening the identified failure
modes and prioritizing them according to their involved risk, and developing the
recommended availability structure diagram. Thus, it is provided with three different
types of heuristics:
1. Heuristics for discerning the types of chemical process equipment involved in
the ASPEN Plus output file,
2. Heuristics for screening the equipment failure modes through the computation
of the Likelihood Coefficient LC, and,
3. Heuristics for determining the final Priority Index for each screened failure
mode through the computation o f the Likelihood, Local Effects, Product
Effects, and Secondary Failures Indices.
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DATA
BASE

OUTPUT
GENERATOR
HEURISTICS
BASE

Figure 4.1 System Architecture
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In essence, the heuristics database is responsible for structuring the final system
availability diagram through the firing of if-then statements constructed from drawn
expertise, and the application of pertinent fuzzy reasoning algorithms.
The output generator consists o f a series of procedures that create a data file
named “report.out” with the final RCM analysis (see Section 4.4.3). Besides o f being
displayed by the system, this text file can be easily edited by any word processor, or
exported to any application software that the user considers convenient.
4.4 Expert Analysis Procedure

The first task o f the system is to identify the number and types of machines, as well as
their corresponding positions in the process flowsheet generated by ASPEN Plus. Then it
starts the solving-problem process by questioning the user about the operation conditions
to which such machines are subjected.

Through the application of the fuzzy logic

reasoning discussed in Chapter 3, the heuristics base computes the Likelihood Coefficient
for all failure modes involved in the analysis, selecting those which have Likelihood
Coefficients higher than the pre-established threshold values.

Once this screening

process its completed, the system computes the Priority Index for each selected failure
mode, and sorts them in descending order according to such indices. Finally, it opens a
data file named “report.out” where the final RCM report is saved for further analysis of
the user.
4.4.1 ASPEN Plus Interface

Figure 4.2 illustrates a typical report generated by ASPEN Plus. The developed expert
system reads the From and To rows o f that report, identifying distinct pieces of
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equipment, and storing how they are arranged in the production process. That is, given a
specific machine, it identifies nearby and downstream pieces of equipment.
In order for the system to be able to do that, the ASPEN Plus user has to employ
the nomenclature depicted in Table 4.1 as embedded words in the names of his process
machinery. For example, machines HEAT_A, HEAT_B, and HEAT_C contained in the
report shown in Figure 4.2 will be considered as three distinct machines by the expert
system, while it will only recognize a single distillation tower named DIST_TWA,
although that name appears several times in the From and To rows.
Once the interface with ASPEN Plus is done, the system notifies the user the
names of the machines that it identified from ASPEN Plus as shown in Figure 4.3. The
system can handle up to 40 different pieces of equipment.
4.4.2 System Processing

The expert system interfaces with the user through a mouse-driven environment. Help
screens are available to the user. A medium-sized window is opened at the upper-right
comer of the monitor screen (see Figure 4.4) each time the user clicks on the “About”
option of the Help menu.
A consultation starts when the user selects the 123 Lotus file or Excel file
generated by ASPEN Plus where the flowsheet o f the process to be analyzed has been
stored (See Figure 4.5). Then, the program begins querying the user on the identified
machines through the utilization of screens prompts.

These query screens contain

relevant questions on the operating conditions to which the scrutinized pieces of
equipment are subjected.

As seen in Figure 4.6, the analyst inputs the required
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Data file created by ASPEN PLUS Rel. 9.1-3

on

21:27:40 Tue Dec 23. 1997

Run TD: SOUR Item: STREAM-SUM Screen: Stream- Sum.Main

Display

muupn

AMMONZA

BOT1

HEAT_A

DIST_TWA

DISTJIWA

HEAT_B

DIST_TWA

DISTJTWA

HEAT_C

MIXED

LIQUID

LIQUID

LIQUID

H20

1.21

3314.88

663.10

NH3

4.39

4.58

0.92

C02

0.00

0.00

H2S

0.10

0.10

NH4 *

0 .00

0.00

NH2COO-

0.00

0.00

HC02-

0.00

0.00

HS-

0.00

OH-

0.00
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Figure 4.2 ASPEN Plus Sample Report
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Table 4.1
System Nomenclature

Equipment Type

Nomenclature

Burner

BURNER

Centrifugal Blower

BLOWER

Centrifugal Pump

PUMP

Converter

CONVERTER

Distillation Tower

DISTTW

Evaporator

EVAPORATOR

Heat Exchanger

HEAT

Multistage Compressor

COMPRESSOR

Pipeline

PIPE

Reactor

REACTOR

Waste Heat Boiler

BOILER
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information by typing a solicited numeric value in the corresponding prompt boxes. All
query screens are provided with a bit-mapped drawing of the associated machine, as well
as an explanation screen describing the equipment characteristics (see Figure 4.7). The
heuristics base performs the needed fuzzy computations as the user inputs the data, and
initiates the program routines that produce the final availability structure once all the
Priority Indices for the selected failure modes have been computed.
4.4.3 System Output

When the heuristics base has screened and prioritized the most critical failure modes to be
included in the final availability structure diagram, the system opens in the working
directory a text file named report.out, where the system's analysis results are stored. This
text file is displayed and can be printed at the end of the consultation through the
system’s conclusion module as shown in Figure 4.8.
A printout of the results generated during a typical system consultation is shown
in Appendix F. The produced report consists of two major types of information. It first
lists the names of those process machines that were considered by the expert system as
not likely to develop any failure mode. It then depicts all the failure modes found to
deserve attention, sorted in descending order according to their Priority Indices. For each
failure mode shown, the software provides the user with relevant information on the
failure mode’s local and system effects, as well as a listing of suggested controls for its
detection.

It also reveals the failure modes corresponding Likelihood, Local Effects,

Product Effects, and Secondary Failures Indices values, so that the analyst can take them
into consideration while developing the process maintenance program.
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@Copyright 1997

Figure 4.5 Open File Window
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Figure 4.6 Query Screen
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4.5 Validation o f the System

During recent years, several frameworks have been developed for the validation of
knowledge based systems. Although validation researchers have struggled to discover
the ultimate approach, there is not yet sufficient evidence to determine which approaches
are more effective, or even which ones are reliable (4).
Systems similar to the one developed here are normally validated through the
evaluation of test scenarios obtained from the available literature. The validity of such
systems are determined by comparing the systems’ results with the actual results reported
in the literature. However, the knowledge involved in this research is still unfamiliar to a
large sector of the industry since it requires the understanding of precipitating factors and
related interdependencies that are fuzzy in nature and intrinsically complex.
Therefore, the validation process employed in this project consisted of using the
same experts from whom the knowledge was gathered to evaluate the performance of the
system. As stated by Ayel and Laurent (1991), there are three advantages of using this
approach:
1. Since the expert has been a part o f the project, there is no major discrepancies
between his expertise and the knowledge contained in the knowledge base.
2. Since the expert knows the kind of problems that falls within the knowledge
boundaries o f the system, he can select the appropriate scenarios to be used in
the validation process.
3. The expert is accessible.
Hence, the qualitative validation of the constructed RCM expert system was
carried out through the performance of a face validation conducted by the domain
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experts, followed by a predictive validation. The rest of this chapter is devoted to the
explanation of these validation techniques.
4.5.1 Face Validation

During a face validation, the domain expert reviews the developed system, and comments
on its performance. For a prototype system, like the one constructed during this study, a
face validation is appropriate to determine whether the system satisfies all functional
specifications, as well as to detect any possible flaws of the system.
The RCM expert system was presented to the domain experts headed by Mr.
Marco Araya, a current researcher and doctoral candidate in chemical engineering at the
University of Alabama who has more than three years of experience as a process engineer
for BASF, for their critique. Fictional cases were executed to demonstrate the system’s
performance as an analytical tool.
This validation process consisted of two major parts, the development of
individual test cases for each of the eleven pieces o f equipment considered by the system,
and the development of test cases with process flowsheets comprising at least three
different industrial machines. Regarding the individual test cases, ten to fifteen distinct
scenarios were created for each machine type.

Several working conditions were

simulated, and the generated RCM analysis reports were carefully examined by the
experts. The process test cases involved the construction of fictional scenarios where
three to six machines were linked together. The main purpose of such test cases was to
assess the performance of the expert system when estimating secondary failure effects.
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Out of the ten processes discussed in Section 3.3.1, only the sulfuric acid and
nitric acid processes could be fully evaluated by the expert system during the validation
phase.

The other eight chemical processes comprise equipment not included in the

knowledge base of the system.

Nevertheless, the following equipment arrangements

were used during the validation of the system (the machines are listed in downstream
order):
•

Burner, Waste Heat Boiler, Converter, Blower, and Heat Exchanger

•

Compressor, Distillation Tower, Heat Exchanger, and Pump

•

Reactor, Pipe, Pump, and Evaporator

•

Blower, Pipe, Reactor, Distillation Tower, and Pump

•

Centrifugal Compressor, Burner, Blower, and Waste Heat Boiler

•

Converter, Pump, Burner, Blower, Pipe, and Reactor

In general, the experts gave favorable feedback (see Appendix G). The system’s
query methodology was rated by the experts as effective in capturing the most relevant
factors affecting the normal functioning of the process machinery.

Moreover, the

conclusions reached at the end of most of the consultations were regarded as satisfactory.
Nevertheless, the experts expressed their concerns with the way in which factors
such as the atomizing air rate for the burner, catalyst pH for the converter, liquid feed rate
for the distillation tower, rotor speed for the reactor, and water pH for the waste heat
boiler were classified and weighted by the system. Moreover, some employed technical
terms such as distillate substance (instead of leaving liquid) and fe d liquid (instead of
feeding liquid) for the distillation tower query were catalogued as “erroneous” by the
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experts. They also objected the selection of the C 02 environment as the only corrosive
environment considered by the system for determining gas corrosivity.
In response to their criticisms, the identified precipitating factors were re
classified and their corresponding weights changed according to the experts’
expectations, the technical terms used in the different modules of the system reviewed
and modified in accordance to the technical language used in the chemistry field, and the
H2S 0 4 corrosive environment incorporated into the system’s analytical procedure.
Finally, the prototype system was shown to Mr. Ricardo Mora, a maintenance
engineer at DSM Shessield Plastics, located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. Mr. Mora, who
did not take part in the knowledge engineering phase of this research, utilized the expert
system to individually analyze the operating conditions of blowers, compressors, pumps,
and heat exchangers normally employed in the plant. His comments of the system’s
responses were also favorable. He indicated that the failure modes revealed by the expert
system were common, and did precipitate with a relatively high frequency in the plant.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

5.1 Comments on This Research

This work has focused on the development o f a innovative new framework for the
implementation of reliability centered maintenance in industrial settings.

The main

means used for reaching such a goal was the creation of a computer expert system that
successfully embodied both relevant maintenance and equipment expertise, and efficient
approximate reasoning techniques. Thus, the final product of this study was a versatile
knowledge-based system for the application of RCM in the chemical industry. Although
the chemical process industry was selected as the application domain for this research, the
developed RCM framework postulated here was designed to be implemented in all the
maintenance activity spectrum regardless of the type of industry.

Therefore, it is

encouraged to use this RCM methodology in other manufacturing areas such as the
automotive, metallurgic, power, and aviation industries among others.
This work represents a pioneer effort in automating the implementation of RCM
via an intelligent computer system. This study has also incorporated a technique that has
proven successful in other areas of knowledge, fuzzy reasoning, in the evaluation and
assessment of equipment failure modes. Finally, an alternative to the traditional RCM
decision tree for prioritizing failure modes was presented through the development o f the
Priority Index, which not only takes into account the relevancy of the failure modes local
and product effects, but also their likelihood of occurring as well as associated negative
consequences on adjacent machinery.
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5.2 Key Contributions

The completed research substantially contributes to the area of equipment maintenance
management. First, it provided industrial practitioners with a versatile tool for estimating
possible machine failure occurrences. This tool enables them to better comprehend the
complexity of failure mode interdependencies and devise appropriate reliability
maintenance strategies. Second, the study produced an innovative new framework for
Reliability Centered Maintenance, which can be characterized by the flexibility typical of
computer based knowledge systems. Finally, the utilization of approximate reasoning in
both the screening and prioritization o f distinct equipment failure modes represents an
extension of the available knowledge in reliability management.

It brings a better

understanding of the mechanics involved in equipment reliability and maintainability
through a new technique for failure mode analysis and functional interdependency
assessment.
With respect to the chemical process industry, a new chapter in the analysis and
evaluation of failure mode precipitating factors was written through the quantification
and fuzzification of critical, important, and related factors for each one of the eighty
failure modes under scrutiny. However, the most important benefit resulting from this
research is the eventual implementation o f prototype expert systems built according to the
methodology here developed, which will lead to the propagation of equipment
maintenance expertise to industrial settings. Process engineers will be able to reduce
production losses by properly detecting and addressing potential failures of key pieces of
equipment early in the production process designing stages, or as a complementary
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reliability centered maintenance tool to their conventional maintenance management
strategies when historical records of machinery malfunctions are available.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research

This work can be extended through the implementation of any or all of the following
recommendations:
•

The developed expert system could be provided with a learning capability to
improve the accuracy of its final output. When discrepancies exist, the user
should be allowed to indicate what specific failure modes he was expecting to
see in the final availability structure diagram. Then, the system’s learning
engine should alter the corresponding precipitating factors weights and
magnitude limits in such a way that the output of the failure mode screening
phase could meet the expert’s expectations.

•

More research is needed to develop a more realistic precipitating factor
fuzzification process.

During this study, linear fuzzification was assumed

since, according to the available literature, it is a widely used practice that has
shown to yield acceptable results. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the
effect of a particular failure mode linearly increases as its critical limits are
reached.

An exponential, logarithm, or normal distribution, just to give

examples, may describe more accurately the behavior of this factor effect-limit
relationship.
•

While determining the different failure mode Priority Indices, the dimensions
of the production process should be taken into account in the analysis. In this
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study, only adjacent pieces of equipment were considered when assessing
secondary failure effects. However, this should be a function of the distances
between the machine presenting the failure mode, and all other process
equipment.
•

Regarding the assignment of threshold values for failure mode screening, such
values could be defined as varying terms associated to the factors precipitating
the failure modes.

Hence, instead of a fixed threshold value as the one

assumed in this research, a mathematical model or function should be defined
for determining such failure mode threshold values according to the number of
precipitating factors involved, and their corresponding weights and magnitude
limits.
•

A back propagation neural network could be embedded into the system to
assist the experts in the classification of precipitating factors, and in the
assignment o f their associated weights, so that more accurate knowledge can
be added to the system. Three types of precipitating factors were defined in
this study: critical, important, and related factors; however, for other
applications, such a classification may be inappropriate. Thus, if machine
failure records exist where operational conditions have been registered, a
neural network model could be employed to help in the clustering of identified
precipitating factors, and in the assessment o f the magnitude which such
factors influence the precipitation of the distinct equipment failure modes.
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•

Finally, crisp magnitude limits were adopted here for each one o f the
identified failure mode precipitating factors. However, there may be some
cases where fuzzy rather than crisp limits might be more appropriate and
realistic. When fuzzy limits are assumed for a particular precipitating factor,
its resulting trapezoidal number will differ from the ones defined in this
research since there will be not any abrupt rise or fall of the factor-effect
function once the limits are encountered.

Instead, a smooth curve should

characterize the fuzzified function.
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APPENDIX A
IDENTIFIED PROCESS EQUIPMENT AND THEIR FAILURE MODES

The following pieces of equipment and their corresponding failure modes were obtained
from the ten chemical processes discussed in Section 3.3.1. The literature sources used in
this analysis are listed in the references [9, 16, 17, 30, 45, 53, 55, 63, 64, 65, 66. 78, 81,
86, 89. 90, 98].

ACID TANK
1. cracked or damaged shell 2. clogged roof drain 3. defective porcelain plug valve 4.
corroded tank shell 5. damaged outside painting 6. damaged discharge nozzle seal 7.
corroded tank vent 8. damaged roof support 9. leaking drain trap 10. stuck safety valve

AIR FILTER
1. corroded screens 2. deformed screens 3. stuck screen curtains gears 4. clogged
screens 5. material deposits inside motor 6. empty rinsing oil cleaning receptacle 7.
broken curtain travel band 8. defective sludge scraper

BLOWER
I. obstructed inlet and outlet ducts 2. cracked inlet box 3. misalign wheel bearings 4.
cracked wheel 5. damaged shaft seals 6. expanded shaft 7. worn wheel blades 8.
misalign couplings and inlet bells 9. worn scroll and housing liners

BRINE PURIFIER
1. damaged heating coils 2. faulty in-flow valves 3. clogged tank outlets 4. worn stirrer
bearings 5. non-lubricated drive bearings and gears 7. damaged nozzle seals

BUBBLE-CAP TOWER
1. leaking liquid draw-off nozzle 2. clogged liquid draw-off outlet 3. corroded bubble
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caps 4. bent trusses 5. wrapped capscracked trays 6. deformed cap riser 7. obstructed
vapor outlet 8. defective vapor flow valve

BURNER
1. obstructed inlet and outlet ducts of blower 2. cracked inlet box of blower 3. misalign
wheel bearings o f blower 4. cracked wheel of blower 5. damaged shaft seals of blower
6. expanded shaft of blower 7. worn wheel blades of blower 8. misalign couplings inlet
bells of blower 9. worn scroll and housing liners of blower 10. damaged mechanical
seals in stuffing box of pump 11. worn impeller of pump 12. faulty thrust bearing of
pump 13. deformed shaft of pump 14. leaking casing of pump 15. faulty shaft couplings
of pump 16. faulty impeller wear ring o f pump 17. plugged spray nozzle in combustion
chamber 18. carbonaceous matter formation in combustion chamber

CALCINER
1. deformed lifting bars 2. stuck scraper chain 3. leaking gas seals 4. dirty burner tips 5.
worn motor drive and bearings 6. clogged discharge chute 7. defective water sprays 8.
cracked pan burners

CARBONATING TOWER
1. blinded plate apertures 2. cracked cooling coils 3. corroded or plugged inlet/outlet
nozzles 3. deformed plate convex caps 4. plugged baffles and cooling pipes 5.
obstructed magma outlet 6. damaged C 0 2 inlet nozzle

C 0 2 ABSORBER
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle

C 0 2 STRIPPER
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle
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COMPRESSOR
1. deformed thrust bearings 2. plugged stationary elements 3. eroded impeller exit tips
4. damaged shaft and inter-stage seals 5. misalign shaft

CONDENSER
1. broken expansion joints 2. cracked tubes 3. deformed impingement plate 4. loose
bell head 5. tom loose tubes 6. dirty tubes 7. corroded exchanger surfaces

CONVERTER
1. damaged supporting grids 2. corroded or cracked supporting flanges 3. plugged vessel
walls and ducts 4. fouled heat exchanger tubes

CRUSHER
1. bent eccentric shaft 2. worn jaws 3. clogged discharge opening 4. non-lubricated
shaft bearings 5. damaged belts 6. loose stationary jaw

CRYSTALLIZER
1. leaking storage pan 2. defective heating device 3. defective screw drive shaft 4.
corroded piping 5. defective gates

CYLINDRICAL COOLER
I. clogged discharge duct 2. non-lubricated shaft bearings 3. worn wheel blades 4. worn
toothed band 5. broken rotation band 6. dirty motor 7. misalign shaft bearings

DEBUTANIZER
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle
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DEETHANIZER
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle

D EMETHANIZER
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle

DEPROPANIZER
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle

DIAPHRAGM CELL
1. worn titanium anodes 2. plugged diaphragm pores 3. dirty diaphragm surface 4.
corroded or defective lead casting 5. clogged overflow pipe

DIGESTOR
1. worn stirrer bearings 2. non-lubricated drive bearings and gears 3. corroded tank walls
4. damaged discharge nozzle seal 5. defective heating coils 6. corroded or plugged
inlets and outlets

DISTILLATION TOWER
1. deformed or broken rings 2. unleveled liquid distributor 3. plugged or corroded
distributor 4. fouled column packing or internals

DRIER
1. clogged discharge duct 2. non-lubricated shaft bearings 3. worn wheel blades 5. worn
toothed band 6. broken rotation band 7. dirty motor 8. misalign shaft bearings
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DRUM FILTER
I. blinded cloth 2. faulty automatic control valve 3. worn rotating and stationary
surfaces 4. damaged stub spring 5. clogged internal compartment pipes 6. deformed or
worn doctor blade 7. defective water sprays 8. worn drum bearings and shaft 9. clogged
discharge outlet

DRYING TOWER
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle

ECONOMIZER
1. broken expansion joints 2. cracked tubes 3. deformed impingement plate 4. loose bell
head 5. tom loose tubes 6. dirty tubes 7. corroded exchanger surfaces

EVAPORATOR
1. damaged mechanical seals in stuffing box of pump 2. worn impeller of pump 3. faulty
thrust bearings of pump 4. deformed shaft of pump 5. leaking casing of pump 5. faulty
shaft couplings of pump 7. faulty impeller wear ring of pump 8. broken tube support
baffles of heat exchanger 9. cracked tubes o f heat exchanger 10. deformed impingement
plate o f heat exchanger 11. fouled tubes of heat exchanger 12. corroded exchanger and
kettle surfaces 13. plugged or corroded vapor heads walls 14. leaking circulation pipe
joints 15. plugged tube inlets

FRACTIONATOR
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle

FURNACE
1. leaking convective gas section 2. dirty or corroded tube interior 3. bulged tubes 4.
thermally cracked tubes 5. damaged diffusion baffle tile system 6. cracked side-wall
banks 7. damaged fuel-flow control valve
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GAS MIXER
1. obstructed inlet and outlet ducts 2. cracked inlet box 3. misalign wheel bearings 4.
cracked wheel 5. damaged shaft seals 6. expanded shaft 7. worn wheel blades 8.
misalign couplings and inlet bells 9. worn scroll and housing liners 10. dirty motor
unbalanced wheel 11. defective automatic suction valve 12. defective cylinder
inlet/outlet nozzles

g a s - h 2o s e p a r a t o r

1. faulty gas-flow control valve 2. cracked tube sheet 3. dirty fiber packing 4. damaged
separator seals 5. broken tubes 6. bad-mounted tubes 7. perforated packing or vanes

H20-COOLED COOLER
1. clogged discharge duct 2. non-lubricated shaft bearings 3. defective water sprays 4.
wom toothed band 5. broken rotation band 6. dirty motor 7. misalign shaft bearings 8.
cracked water pipe

HEAT EXCHANGER
1. broken tube support baffles 2. cracked tubes 3. deformed impingement plate 4. fouled
tubes 5. corroded exchanger and kettle surfaces

HEATER
1. clogged air flow intake 2. leaking convective section 3. material deposits in tube
interior 4. bulged tubes 5. defective automatic steam inlet valves 6. thermally cracked
tubes 7. dirty burner tips 8. inadequate tube spacing 9. clogged liquid distributor 10.
damaged automatic flow-control valve

HUMIDIFIER
1. dirty damper 2. corroded fan blades 3. plugged spray chambers 4. dirty diffuser 5.
non-lubricated motor bearings 6. tom seals

HYDROGENATOR
1. contaminated catalyst 2. cracked vessel shell 3. faulty hydrogen flow control valve 4.
faulty internal heat exchanger 5. faulty reactant gas control valve
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KILN
1. leaking kiln roof 2. clogged upright duct 3. dirty burner tips 4. clogged coal feeder 5.
clogged air flow nozzles 6. cracked pan burners 7. dirty fire and ducts zones 8. stuck
hoist

METHANATOR
1. contaminated catalyst 2. cracked vessel shell 3. faulty hydrogen flow control valve 4.
faulty internal heat exchanger 5. faulty reactant gas control valve

OXIDATION CHAMBER
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle

PADDLE MIXER
1. worn agitator bearings 2. non- lubricated drive bearings and gears 3 corroded tank
walls 4. damaged discharge nozzle seals

PIPE
1. leaking fittings or joints 2. cracked pipe wall 3. plugged inner section 4. bent pipe 5.
corroded or eroded inner wall

PRILLING TOWER
1. clogged spray nozzles 2. faulty liquid inlets 3. faulty liquid distributor 4. defective
hot air valve

PRILLS TANK
1. cracked floor 2. damaged shell 3. splintered tank material 4. damaged drain outlet 5.
broken roof support 6. clogged vent
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PUMP
1. damaged mechanical seals in stuffing box 2. worn impeller 3. faulty thrust bearings
4. deformed shaft 5. leaking casing 6. faulty shaft couplings 7. faulty impeller wear ring

QUENCH TOWER
1. deformed rings 2. unevenly spaced support grid bars 3. unleveled acid distributor 4.
crushed intermediate packing layers 5. deformed vapor distributor hats 6. unattached
hold down grid 7. blown off chimney tray pan hats 8. defective liquid draw-off nozzle

REACTOR
1. worn or faulty stirrer couplings 2. non-lubricated drive bearings and gears 3. damaged
discharge nozzle seals 4. defective heating coils

REBOILER
1. corroded internal elements 2. leaking tower bottom tray 3. damaged seal pan 4.
damaged draw-off pan 5. partially plugged reboiler 6. restricted reboiler feed line 7.
submerged reboiler vapor return nozzle 8. leaking housing tower 9. clogged reboiler
outlet line

RECIPROCATING COMPRESSOR
1. worn pistons, liners, packing and rods 2. dirty packing caps 3. broken valves 4.
damaged cylinder seat 5. incorrectly spaced piston 6. loose piston nut 7. misalign
cylinder 8. faulty piston rings 9. burned or leaky valves 10. worn valve operating gear

REFORMER
1. defective steam inlet valves 2. dirty or corroded tube interior 3. bulged tubes 4.
thermally cracked tubes 5. contaminated catalyst 6. cracked cylinder shell 7. defective
reactant gas flow valve 8. deformed catalyst packing
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SATURATOR
1. blinded efflux holes 2. faulty or clogged overflow device 3. cracked cooling coil 4.
corroded or plugged inlet/outlet nozzles 5. deformed bottom grill

SETTLING TANK
1. leaking outlet seals 2. leaking bottom outlet seal 3. corroded tank shell

SLAKER
1. clogged discharge duct 2. non-lubricated shaft bearings 3. defective or clogged water
pipe nozzle 4. worn toothed band 5. broken rotation band 6. dirty motor 7. misalign
shaft bearings 8. corroded drum walls

STIRRED MILL
1. corroded grinder body 2. worn grinding vanes 3. plugged armature rotating base 4.
defective armature base seals 5. worn armature bearings 6. non-lubricated drive bearings
and gears

TILTING PAN FILTER
1. blinded cloth 2. clogged or corroded distributor tubes 3. defective wash sprays 4.
worn filter medium 5. stuck or corroded pan rotating axis 6. faulty automatic vacuum
valve 7. worn roller bearings or gears 8. defective pan inverting mechanism

TREATMENT TANK
1. worn stirrer bearings 2. non-lubricated drive bearings and gears 3. corroded tank walls
4. damaged discharge nozzle seal 5. defective heating coils 6. corroded or plugged inlets
and outlets

TROMMEL
1. faulty speed controller 2. blinded screens
structural members 5. deflected central shaft

3. worn spur-girt gear
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4. obstructed

TUBULAR COOLER
1. broken expansion joints 2. cracked tubes 3. damaged bell head seals 4. plugged tubes
5. tom loose tubes 6. corroded surfaces

TURBINE
1. worn flexible coupling teeth 2. non-lubricated bearings 3. sticky pipe or pedestal 4.
misalign shaft 5. sticky valve stems 6. leaking valves 7. damaged sleeves 8. leaking
glands

TURBO EXPANDER
1. leaking oil bearings 2. obstructed seal gas 3. leaking heat barrier wall 4. frozen rotor
5. overloaded flange pipes 6. misalign shaft coupling 7. over-pressured bearing thrust
face 8. clogged oil lines 9. deteriorated rotor back seals 10. crushed filter cartridge 11.
contaminated filter cartridge 12. flooded oil reservoir

VESSEL
1. cracked vessel shell 2. faulty valves 3. corroded shell 4. damaged drain outlet 5.
defective pressure controller

WASTE HEAT BOILER
1. broken expansion joints 2. fouled tubes 3. deformed demister mesh pad 4. cracked
boiler drum shell
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APPENDIX B
FAILURE MODES EFFECTS AND SUGGESTED CONTROLS

The information presented in this appendix was obtained from relevant equipment
maintenance literature shown in the references.

BURNER Ref. [9, 21, 23, 24, 25, 53,63, 86, 108]

A. Obstructed Inlet or Outlet Ducts of Blower.
Local Effects:
- Diminished gas flow delivered by blower
- Possible overloading of blower motor
- May precipitate blower seals damage
System Effects:
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- Explosion hazard
- A considerable amount of atmospheric pollutants may be released by
burner
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Protective screens test
B. Cracked Inlet Box of Blower.
Local Effects:
- Flow pressure loss in blower
- Overloading of the fan motor
- Gas/air leakage
- Eventual loss of air flow
System Effects:
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- Contamination hazard
- Possible corrosive effect on nearby equipment
- Explosion hazard
- Increase in atmospheric pollutants
Suggested Controls:
- Gas detector
- Visual inspection
- Dye penetrant inspection
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C. Misaligned Wheel Bearings of Blower.
Local Effects:
- Fan motor overloaded
- Possible bending of blower's shaft
- Extreme blower vibration and noise
- Blowing power loss
- Eventual decrease in air flow to combustion chamber
- Burner efficiency reduced
System Effects:
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- Nearby equipment may be atrophied due to transmitted
vibration
Suggested Control:
- Mechanical running test
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Rotor stability test
D. Cracked Wheel of Blower.
Local Effects:
- Total loss of blower operation
- Impeller may fall off
- Possible severe damage to fan motor
- Eventually, burner operation must be shut down
System Effects:
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- Explosion Hazard
Suggested Controls:
- Dye penetrant inspection
- Fluorescent (Zyglo) inspection
E. Damaged Shaft Seals of Blower.
Local Effects:
- Gas/air leakage around shaft
- Loss of blower pressure and efficiency
- Possible corrosion of other elements in blower
- Low combustion efficiency
System Effects
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- Contamination hazard
- Possible corrosive effect on nearby equipment
- Increase in atmospheric pollutants
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- Explosion hazard
Suggested Controls:
- Static gas test
- Visual inspection
- Temperature detectors (thermocouples & electrical resistance detectors)
F. Expanded Shaft of Blower.
Local Effects:
- Extreme blower vibration upon startup
- Eventual failure of blower bearings
- Possible blower seals damage
- Reduction in air flow to combustion chamber
System Effects:
- Temperature in the area may get out of control and nearby
equipment nozzles and pipes can be damaged
- Nearby equipment may be affected by transmitted
vibration
- Explosion hazard
- Increase in air pollutants originated from combustion
Suggested Controls:
- Mechanical running test
- Vibration analysis
- Temperature detectors (thermocouples & electrical resistance detectors)
G. Worn Wheel Blades of Blower.
Local Effects:
- Diminished delivered air/gas flow
- Possible unbalance of blower shaft
- Combustion efficiency reduced
System Effects:
- Increase in atmospheric pollutants originated from combustion
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Rotor stability test
H. Misaligned Couplings Inlet Bells of Blower.
Local Effects:
- Overheating o f blower bearings and motor
- Bearing failure
- Increase of bearing dust seals wear
- Air flow to combustion chamber possibly reduced
- Combustion efficiency affected
System Effects:
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
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Suggested Controls:
- Temperature detectors (thermocouples & electrical resistance detectors)
- Mechanical test
- Visual inspection
I. Worn Scroll and Housing Liners of Blower.
Local Effects:
- Damaged blower liners can break free
- Eventual damage to blower wheel
- If wheel breaks, air flow to combustion chamber will cease
- Burner operation eventually must be shut down
System Effects:
- Explosion hazard
- Liners debris may be blown away and cause major
problems to connected equipment such as compressors,
converters, heaters, etc.
- Nearby equipment may get affected by transmitted
vibration
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Magnetic particle inspection
- Mechanical running test
J. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Pump's capacity severely reduced
- Increase in pump vibration
- Combustion greatly affected
- Burner efficiency greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Transmitted vibration may damage close machinery
- Corrosion problems may prevail in adjacent areas
Suggested Controls:
- Hydrostatic pressure test
- Visual inspection
K. Worn Impeller of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Pump's capacity severely reduced
- Increase in pump vibration
- Reduction in suction power
- Combustion reduced
- Burner gas quality greatly affected
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System Effects:
- Upstream ducts may get clogged
- Transmitted vibration may damage attached
pipes or equipment
- Associated compressors and turbines may overload
Suggested Controls:
- Hydrostatic pressure test
- Flow analysis
- Visual inspection
L. Faulty Thrust Bearings o f Pump.
Local Effects:
- Excessive pump vibration
- Pump motor may overload and run hot
- Possible shaft/gear misalignment
- Increase in shaft radial movement
- Eventual pump shut down
- Burner operation may have to be stopped
System Effects:
- Destructive equipment vibration
- If motor overloads, nearby equipment may
experience electrical problems
- If pump ceases working, related equipment detriment
should be expected
Suggested Controls:
- Pressure pulsation (piezoelectric pressure) test
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Bearing temperature control
M. Deformed Shaft of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Pumping efficiency greatly reduced
- Excessive pump vibration
- Increase in shaft radial movement
- Possible pump bearings damage
- Possible pump seals damage
- Eventual pump couplings failure
- Burner gas quality greatly affected
- Burner may have to be shut down
System Effects:
- Destructive equipment vibration
- Possible clogging of attached pipes
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- Fluid leakage around shaft may increase, which
could lead to contamination problems
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Tensile stress analysis
- Pressure pulsation (piezoelectric pressure) test
- Vibration analysis
N. Leaking Casing o f Pump.
Local Effects:
- Reduced pumping rate
- Possible corrosion effects on pump elements
- Combustion efficiency reduced
- Burner gas quality greatly affected
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Explosion hazard
- Corrosion problems in nearby machinery
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Hydrostatic pressure test
- Flow analysis
O. Faulty Shaft Couplings of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Pump shaft misalignment
- Atrophied shaft movement
- Loss o f pumping efficiency
- Increase in pump noise and vibration
- Possible pump seals damage
- Eventually, pump total shut down
- Burner gas quality greatly reduced
- Eventually, burner may have to be shut down
System Effects:
- Destructive equipment vibration
- If pump ceases working, related equipment
detriment should be expected
- Possible clogging of attached pipes
- Fluid leakage around shaft may increase, which
could lead to contamination problems
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Pressure pulsation (piezoelectric pressure) test
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P. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Internal liquid leakage from the pump discharge back
the pump suction
- Eminent pump impeller wear
- Potential corrosion effect on pump's internals
- Pump's capacity greatly reduced
- Combustion efficiency greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Possible clogging of attached pipes
- Downstream equipment may be detrimentally affected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Flow analysis
- Venturi analysis
- Hydrostatic pressure test
Q. Plugged Spray Nozzle in Combustion Chamber.
Local Effects:
- Poor air flow stream
- Increase in atmospheric pollutants originated from the combustion
- Burner capacity greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Explosion hazard
Suggested Effects:
- Pollutant detector
- Visual inspection
- Venturi analysis
R. Carbonaceous Matter Formation in Combustion Chamber.
Local Effects:
- Combustion interference
- Vaporization unsteady
System Effects:
- No major effects on downstream equipment expected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
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CENTRIFUGAL BLOWER Ref. [10, 16, 77, 53, 64, 78]

A. Obstructed Inlet or Outlet Ducts.
Local Effects:
- Diminished gas/air flow delivered by blower
- Possible overloading o f blower motor
- May precipitate seals damage
System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature may get out of control
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Protective screens test
B. Cracked Inlet Box.
Local Effects:
- Flow pressure loss
- Overloading of the fan motor
- Gas/air leakage
- Eventual loss of equipment's function
System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature will get out o f control
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- If handling gas, contamination hazard
- Possible corrosive effect on nearby equipment
Suggested Controls:
- Gas detector
- Visual inspection
- Dye penetrant inspection
C. Misaligned Wheel Bearings.
Local Effects:
- Motor overloaded
- Possible bending of shaft
- Extreme equipment vibration and noise
- Blowing power loss
System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature may get out o f control
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
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- Nearby equipment may be atrophied due to transmitted
vibration
Suggested Control:
- Mechanical running test
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Rotor stability test
D. Cracked Wheel.
Local Effects:
- Total loss of equipment operation
- Impeller may fall off
- Possible severe damage to fan motor
System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature will get out of control
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
Suggested Controls:
- Dye penetrant inspection
- Fluorescent (Zyglo) inspection
E. Damaged Shaft Seals.
Local Effects:
- Gas/air leakage around shaft
- Loss o f blower pressure and efficiency
- Possible corrosion of other elements
System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature will get out of control
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- If handling gas, contamination hazard
- Possible corrosive effect on nearby equipment
Suggested Controls:
- Static gas test
- Visual inspection
- Temperature detectors (thermocouples & electrical resistance detectors)
F. Expanded Shaft.
Local Effects:
- Extreme vibration upon startup
- Eventual failure of bearings
- Possible seals damage
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System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature may get out o f control
- Nearby equipment may be affected by transmitted
vibration
Suggested Controls:
- Mechanical running test
- Vibration analysis
- Temperature detectors (thermocouples & electrical resistance detectors)
G. Worn Wheel Blades.
Local Effects:
- Diminished delivered air/gas flow
- Possible unbalance of shaft
System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature may get out o f control
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Rotor stability test
H. Misaligned Couplings Inlet Bells.
Local Effects:
- Overheating of bearings and motor
- Bearing failure
- Increase of bearing dust seals wear
System Effects:
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
Suggested Controls:
- Temperature detectors (thermocouples & electrical resistance detectors)
- Mechanical test
- Visual inspection
I. Worn Scroll and Housing Liners.
Local Effects:
- Damaged liners can break free
- Eventual damage to wheel
- No immediate loss of efficiency expected
System Effects:
- Liners debris may be blown away and
cause major problems to connected equipment
such as compressors, converters, heaters, etc.
- Nearby equipment may get affected by transmitted
vibration
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Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Magnetic particle inspection
- Mechanical running test

CENTRIFUGAL PUMP Ref. [8, 15, 41, 42, 74, 86, 89, 108]

A. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box.
Local Effects:
- Pump's capacity severely reduced
- Increase in equipment vibration
- Possible fluid leakage
System Effects:
- If pumping fluid is toxic, contamination hazard
- Transmitted vibration may damage close machinery
- Corrosion problems may prevail in adjacent areas
Suggested Controls:
- Hydrostatic pressure test
- Visual inspection
B. Worn Impeller.
Local Effects:
- Pump's capacity severely reduced
- Increase in machine vibration
- Reduction in suction power
System Effects:
- Upstream ducts may get clogged
- Transmitted vibration may damage attached pipes or equipment
- Associated compressors and turbines may overload
Suggested Controls:
- Hydrostatic pressure test
- Flow analysis
- Visual inspection
C. Faulty Thrust Bearings.
Local Effects:
- Excessive pump vibration
- Motor may overload and run hot
- Possible shaft/gear misalignment
- Increase in shaft radial movement
- Eventual pump shut down
System Effects:
- Destructive equipment vibration
- If motor overloads, nearby equipment may
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experience electrical problems
- If pump ceases working, related equipment detriment
should be expected
Suggested Controls:
- Pressure pulsation (piezoelectric pressure) test
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Bearing temperature control
D. Deformed Shaft.
Local Effects:
- Pumping efficiency greatly reduced
- Excessive pump vibration
- Increase in shaft radial movement
- Possible bearings damage
- Possible seals damage
- Eventual couplings failure
System Effects:
- Destructive equipment vibration
- Possible clogging of attached pipes
- Fluid leakage around shaft may increase, which
could lead to contamination problems
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Tensile stress analysis
- Pressure pulsation (piezoelectric pressure) test
- Vibration analysis
E. Leaking Casing.
Local Effects:
- Reduced pumping rate
- Possible corrosion effects on pump's
components and attachments
System Effects:
- If pumping fluid is toxic, contamination hazard
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Hydrostatic pressure test
- Flow analysis
F. Faulty Shaft Couplings.
Local Effects:
- Shaft misalignment
- Atrophied shaft movement
- Loss of pumping efficiency
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- Increase in pump noise and vibration
- Possible seals damage
- Eventually, pump total shut down
System Effects:
- Destructive equipment vibration
- If pump ceases working, related equipment
detriment should be expected
- Possible clogging of attached pipes
- Fluid leakage around shaft may increase, which
could lead to contamination problems
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Pressure pulsation (piezoelectric pressure) test
G. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring.
Local Effects:
- Internal liquid leakage from the pump discharge back
the pump suction
- Eminent impeller wear
- Potential corrosion effect on pump's internals
- Pump's capacity greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Possible clogging of attached pipes
- Downstream equipment may be detrimentally affected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Flow analysis
- Venturi analysis
- Hydrostatic pressure test

CONVERTER Ref. [21, 23, 45, 51, 63, 64]

A. Damaged Supporting Grids.
Local Effects:
- Potential catalyst loss
- Catalyst bed disarrangement
- Eventual loss o f reaction efficiency
System Effects:
- Batch of material in process may have to be wasted
- Catalyst debris may obstruct attached ducts
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
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B. Corroded or Cracked Supporting Flanges.
Local Effects:
- Diminished conversion efficiency
- Possible catalyst contamination
- Weakening of converter structure
System Effects:
- Besides the loss in the quality of the reaction no
major effects on nearby equipment should be expected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Dye penetrant inspection
C. Plugged Vessel Walls and Ducts.
Local Effects:
- Unequal gas distribution
- Poor conversion efficiency
- Potential cracking o f shell
System Effects:
- If shell cracks, contamination hazard
- Wall scum may affect nearby compressors and pumps
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Ultrasonic inspection
D. Fouled Heat Exchanger Tubes.
Local Effects:
- Converter efficiency greatly reduced
- Increase in internal gas temperature
- Possible damage o f flanges and support grids
- Reaction heat out o f control
- Eventually, total loss of function
System Effects:
- Extremely high gas temperatures can damage
circulating pipes and downstream machines' seals
- If converter ceases working, the whole process will
probably have to be shut down
Suggested Controls:
- Dye penetrant inspection
- Fluorescent (Zyglo) inspection
- Differential temperature control
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DISTILLATION TOWER Ref. [1, 9, 16, 21,45, 53, 63, 75]

A. Deformed or Broken Rings.
Local Effects:
- Ring migration
- Rings may get caught in gate and control valve inlets
- Equipment efficiency greatly reduced
- Eventually, column will have to be shut down
System Effects:
- Other associated equipment like centrifugal pumps, and
heaters may be seriously damaged by ring particles
- Eventually, overall system will have to be shut down
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Material flow analysis
B. Unleveled Liquid Distributor.
Local Effects:
- Poor liquid distribution
- Very low tower efficiency
System Effects:
- Poor distillate quality
- No major impact expected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
C. Plugged or Corroded Distributor.
Local Effects:
- Fluid contamination
- Reduced tower efficiency
- Poor liquid distribution
- Possible inappropriate column flooding
System Effects:
- Poor distillate quality
- Pumps or compressors handling distillate
may be slightly affected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Column differential pressure analysis
D. Fouled Column Packing or Internals.
Local Effects:
- Premature or inappropriate column flooding
- Deficient vapor flow
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- Possible liquid drainage through chimneys
- Column efficiency greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Fluid spillage may affect the normal functioning
of nearby equipment
- Associated pumps and compressors may fail
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Material flow analysis
- Column differential pressure analysis

EVAPORATOR Ref. [5, 63, 64, 68, 81, 90, 108]

A. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Pump's capacity severely reduced
- Increase in pump vibration
- Contamination hazard
- Poor liquid circulation
- Heat exchanger tubes may get fouled
- Evaporator efficiency reduced
System Effects:
- If pumping fluid is toxic, contamination hazard
- Transmitted vibration may damage nearby machinery
- Corrosion problems may prevail in adjacent areas
Suggested Controls:
- Hydrostatic pressure test
- Visual inspection
B. Worn Impeller of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Pump's capacity severely reduced
- Increase in pump vibration
- Reduction in suction power
- Poor liquid circulation
- Heat exchanger tubes may get fouled
- Evaporator efficiency reduced
System Effects:
- Upstream ducts may get clogged
- Transmitted vibration may damage attached
pipes or equipment
- Associated compressors and turbines may overload
143

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Suggested Controls:
- Hydrostatic pressure test
- Flow analysis
- Visual inspection
C. Faulty Thrust Bearings of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Excessive pump vibration
- Pump motor may overload and run hot
- Possible shaft/gear misalignment
- Increase in shaft radial movement
- Eventual pump shut down
- Heat exchanger may get severely damaged
- Eventual system shut down
System Effects:
- Destructive equipment vibration
- If motor overloads, nearby equipment may
experience electrical problems
- If pump ceases working, related equipment detriment
should be expected
Suggested Controls:
- Pressure pulsation (piezoelectric pressure) test
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Bearing temperature control
D. Deformed Shaft of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Pumping efficiency greatly reduced
- Excessive pump vibration
- Increase in shaft radial movement
- Possible pump bearings damage
- Possible pump seals damage
- Eventual pump couplings failure
- Circulation pipes may result deformed or bent
- Probable poor liquid flow through heating tubes
- Evaporator efficiency greatly affected
System Effects:
- Destructive equipment vibration
- Possible clogging of attached pipes
- Fluid leakage around shaft may increase, which
could lead to contamination problems
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Tensile stress analysis
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- Pressure pulsation (piezoelectric pressure) test
- Vibration analysis
E. Leaking Casing of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Reduced pumping rate
- Contamination hazard
- Possible corrosion effects on pump elements
- Liquid loss
- Heat exchanger tubes may get fouled
- If leak persists, eventual evaporator shut down
System Effects:
- If pumping fluid is toxic, contamination hazard
- Auxiliary heating subsystem may get atrophied
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Hydrostatic pressure test
- Flow analysis
F. Faulty Shaft Couplings of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Pump shaft misalignment
- Atrophied shaft movement
- Loss of pumping efficiency
- Increase in pump noise and vibration
- Possible pump seals damage
- Eventually, pump total shut down
- Circulation pipes may be deformed or bent
- Possible leaking of liquid from pipe joints
- Eventually, evaporator may have to be shut down
System Effects:
- Destructive equipment vibration
- If pump ceases working, related equipment
detriment should be expected
- Possible clogging of attached pipes
- Fluid leakage around shaft may increase, which
could lead to contamination problems
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Pressure pulsation (piezoelectric pressure) test
G. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring of Pump.
Local Effects:
- Internal liquid leakage from the pump discharge back the pump suction
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- Eminent pump impeller wear
- Potential corrosion effect on pump's internals
- Pump's capacity greatly reduced
- If liquid circulation is affected, evaporator efficiency reduced
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Possible clogging of attached pipes
- Downstream equipment may be detrimentally affected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Flow analysis
- Venturi analysis
- Hydrostatic pressure test
H. Broken Tube Support Baffles o f Heat Exchanger.
Local Effects:
- May lead to tube breakage
- Liquid leakage to shell
- Liquid contamination
- Heat exchanger efficiency greatly reduced
- Eventual evaporator shut down
System Effects:
- If tube-side fluid is toxic, contamination hazard
- Process temperature may go out of control
- Related equipment such as pumps and compressors
may be affected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
I. Cracked Tubes of Heat Exchanger.
Local Effects:
- Liquid leakage to shell
- Liquid contamination
- Heat exchanger efficiency greatly reduced
- Pump surge may occur
- Evaporator's elements may get completely wrecked
System Effects:
- If tube-side fluid is toxic, contamination hazard
- Process temperature may go out of control
- Related equipment such as pumps and compressors
may be affected
Suggested Controls:
- Hydrostatic test
- Dye penetrant inspection
- Fluorescent (Zyglo) inspection
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J. Deformed Impingement Plate of Heat Exchanger.
Local Effects:
- Potential erosive effect on tubes
- Evaporator efficiency should not be affected
System Effects:
- No major impact on downstream machines
should be expected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
K. Fouled Tubes o f Heat Exchanger
Local Effects:
- Potential cracking of tubes
- Poor heat transfer efficiency
- Possible damage to support baffles
- Liquid evaporation efficiency reduced
- If tubes crack, possible system wreck
System Effects:
- If tube-side fluid is toxic and tubes crack, contamination hazard
- Process temperature may go out of control
- Related equipment such as pumps and compressors
may be affected
Suggested Controls:
- Eddy current inspection
- Ultrasonic inspection
L. Corroded Exchanger and Kettle Surfaces.
Local Effects:
- Apparatus efficiency greatly reduced
- Liquid contamination
- Liquid evaporation efficiency reduced
System Effects:
- Process temperature may go out of control
- Kettle scum may atrophy attached pipes and pumps
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Eddy current inspection
M. Plugged or Corroded Vapor Heads Walls.
Local Effects:
- Vapor entrairunent
- Loss of evaporation efficiency
System Effects:
- Attached vents and ducts can be damaged
- No major effects on process should be expected
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Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Ultrasonic inspection
N. Leaking Circulation Pipe Joints.
Local Effects:
- Damage to external heat exchanger
- Potential pump surge
- Eventual evaporator shut down
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Flow pressure loss may affect the normal
operation of downstream pumps, compressors or
distillation columns
- If evaporator ceases working, overall process may
have to be shut down
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Radioactive isotope injection
O. Plugged Tube Inlets.
Local Effects:
- Liquid contamination
- Possible fouling of heat exchanger tubes
- Evaporator efficiency greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Clogged inlets may affect the normal operation of
downstream pumps, compressors or distillation towers
- If evaporator ceases working, overall process may
have to be shut down
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Ultrasonic inspection

HEAT EXCHANGER Ref. [16, 27, 29, 53, 61, 83]

A. Broken Tube Support Baffles.
Local Effects:
- May lead to tube breakage
- Cooling medium leakage to shell
- Substance contamination
- Heat exchanger efficiency greatly reduced
- Eventual equipment shut down
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System Effects:
- If tube-side fluid is toxic, contamination hazard
- Process temperature may go out of control
- Related equipment such as pumps and compressors
may be affected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
B. Cracked Tubes.
Local Effects:
- Cooling medium leakage to shell
- Substance contamination
- Heat exchanger efficiency greatly reduced
- Apparatus may get completely wrecked
System Effects:
- If tube-side fluid is toxic, contamination hazard
- Process temperature may go out of control
- Related equipment such as pumps and compressors
may be affected
- If exchanger stops working, entire process may have to
be shut down
Suggested Controls:
- Hydrostatic Test
- Dye penetrant inspection
- Fluorescent (Zyglo) inspection
C. Deformed Impingement Plate.
Local Effects:
- Potential erosive effect on tubes
System Effects:
- No major impact on downstream machines
should be expected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
D. Fouled Tubes.
Local Effects:
- Potential cracking of tubes
- Poor heat transfer efficiency
- Possible damage to support baffles
System Effects:
- If tube-side fluid is toxic and tubes crack, contamination hazard
- Process temperature may go out of control
- Related equipment such as pumps and compressors
may be affected
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Suggested Controls:
- Eddy current inspection
- Ultrasonic inspection
E. Corroded Exchanger and Kettle Surfaces.
Local Effects:
- Apparatus efficiency greatly reduced
- Substance contamination
System Effects:
- Process temperature may go out o f control
- Kettle scum may atrophy attached pipes and pumps
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Eddy current inspection

MULTISTAGE COMPRESSOR Ref. [10, 13, 56, 63, 77, 78]

A. Deformed Thrust Bearings.
Local Effects:
- Increase of axial rotor movement
- Spinning wheel may touch a stationary element
- Compressor internals may wreck
System Effects:
- Wheel pieces may tear through case and cause
human injuries
- Wheel debris may damage downstream equipment
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Mechanical running test
B. Plugged Stationary Elements.
Local Effects:
- Loss of gas compression efficiency
- Increase in discharge temperature
- Motor amp load may go down
- Possible unbalance of the rotor
System Effects:
- Inefficient gas compression may lead to
abnormal performance of downstream equipment
- Increase in discharge temperature may damage
attached equipment nozzles and seals
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Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Ultrasonic inspection
C. Eroded Impellers Exit Tips.
Local Effects:
- Loss of compression efficiency
- May cause shaft unbalance
- Increase in equipment vibration
System Effects:
- Transmitted vibration may damage nearby equipment
- Inefficient gas compression may lead to abnormal
performance of downstream equipment
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Eddy current inspection
D. Damaged Shaft and Interstage (Labyrinth) Seals.
Local Effects:
- Gas compression efficiency greatly reduced
- Gas leakage
- Possible increase in element corrosion
- Possible diaphragms deformation
System Effects:
- Inefficient gas compression may lead to
abnormal performance of downstream equipment
- If compressed gas is toxic or corrosive, contamination or
corrosion problems may developed in nearby machine areas
Suggested Controls:
- Static gas test
- Dye penetrant inspection
- Fluorescent (Zyglo) inspection
E. Misaligned Shaft.
Local Effects:
- Excessive equipment vibration and noise
- Eventually, total loss o f compression function
- Possible damage to labyrinth seals
- Compressor internals most likely to wreck
System Effects:
- Transmitted vibration may damage nearby equipment
- Inefficient gas compression may lead to
abnormal performance of downstream equipment
Suggested Controls:
- Vibration analysis
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- Visual inspection
- Ultrasonic inspection
- Mechanical running test

PIPE Ref. [28, 70, 73, 94, 103]

A. Leaking Fittings or Joints.
Local Effects:
- Pressure loss
- Possible corrosion effect on outer wall and fittings
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Possible damage to attached equipment
- Depending on process, downstream machines may be
seriously affected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Radioactive isotope injection
- Gas detector
B. Cracked Pipe Due To Over-stress.
Local Effects:
- Potential fluid leakage
- Pressure and temperature loss
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Connected equipment may be greatly damaged
- Possible corrosion problems in the area
- If leakage is considerable, overall system may be stopped
Suggested Controls:
- Eddy current inspection
- Radioactive isotope injection
- Tensile stress test
C. Plugged Inner Section.
Local Effects:
- Obstructed flow
- Eventual cracking of pipe
System Effects:
- Connected equipment may be damaged
- If obstruction is considerable or cracking precipitates,
entire process may have to be shut down
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Suggested Controls:
- Ultrasonic inspection
- Flow pressure analysis
D. Bent Pipe.
Local Effects:
- Possible cracking of pipe
- Damage to support hardware
- Possible resulting leakage at fitting locations
System Effects:
- Eminent damage to attached equipment
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
E. Corroded or Eroded Inner Wall.
Local Effects:
- Development of "hot spots" on piping wall
- Eventual pipe fracture
- Fluid contamination
System Effects:
- Contaminated fluid may affect the normal functioning
of downstream machinery
Suggested Controls:
- Ultrasonic inspection
- Eddy current inspection

REACTOR Ref. [7, 64, 65, 96, 101, 111]

A. Worn or faulty Stirrer Couplings.
Local Effects:
- Possible excessive vibration
- Loss of mixing efficiency
- Poor reaction process
System Effects:
- Nearby equipment may be affected by
transmitted vibration
- Possible bending of attached piping
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Magnetic particle inspection
B. Non-lubricated Drive Bearings and Gears.
Local Effects:
- Increase in equipment vibration
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- Possible gear misalignment
- Eventual overheating of stirrer motor
- May lead to reactor shut down
System Effects:
- If reactor functioning does not stop, no major
impact on overall system should be expected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Lubrication records
- Moisture tests
C. Damaged Discharged Nozzle Seals.
Local Effects:
- Internal pressure loss
- Reactor efficiency reduced
- Liquid leakage
- Reaction quality affected
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Associated pumps, heating system, and pipes
are likely to fail
- If liquid is toxic, overall system must be shut down
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Vessel pressure control
D. Defective Heating Coils.
Local Effects:
- Inappropriate heating of mixture
- Poor or failed reaction
System Effects:
- If reaction failed, entire processed material
batch is most likely to be lost
- No major impact on nearby machines' functioning
should be expected
Suggested Controls:
- Temperature detectors (thermocouples & electrical resistance detectors)
- Visual inspection
- Amps meter
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WASTE HEAT BOILER Ref. [2, 9, 16, 45, 63, 78, 109]

A. Broken Expansion Joints.
Local Effects:
- Tube deformation
- Possible heating medium leakage into water
- Substance contamination
- Equipment efficiency greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Product quality greatly affected
- If water is circulated, major equipment damage and
contamination should be expected in nearby areas
- Heating sub-system components may get wrecked
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Hydrostatic test
B. Fouled Tubes.
Local Effects:
- Heating medium leakage into boiling water
- Substance contamination
- Equipment efficiency greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Product quality greatly affected
- If water is circulated, major equipment damage and
contamination should be expected in nearby areas
- Heating sub-system components may get wrecked
Suggested Controls:
- Ultrasonic inspection
- Differential temperature analysis
- Magnetic particle inspection
- Eddy current inspection
C. Deformed Demister Mesh Pad.
Local Effects:
- Poor steam quality
- Small droplets of water in steam
System Effects:
- Increased corrosion in steam ducts
- If steam turbines attached, their
efficiency will be affected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
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D. Cracked Boiler Drum Shell.
Local Effects:
- Total loss of equipment function
- Water leakage from shell
- Eventual fouling of tubes
System Effects:
- Product quality greatly affected
- If water is circulated, major equipment damage and
contamination should be expected in nearby areas
- Heating sub-system components may get wrecked
- Spilled water may damage nearby equipment such as
motors, screens, and gears
- Overall system shut down very likely
Suggested Controls:
- Hydrostatic test
- Dye penetrant inspection
- Fluorescent (Zyglo) inspection
- Eddy current inspection
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APPENDIX C
PRECIPITATING FACTORS

The information included in this appendix was obtained by series of interviews conducted
with doctoral students o f the department of Chemical Engineering at the University of
Alabama. Specialized equipment maintenance literature was also consulted.

BURNER Ref. [9, 21, 23, 24, 25, 53, 63, 86, 108]
A. Obstructed Inlet or Outlet Ducts of Blower.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like dust, fly ash, and sand in gas [0.005 to 20 grains/ft3)
Important Factors:
a. Gas density [0.1 to 0.6 lb/ft3]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [50 to 100%]
B. Cracked Inlet Box of Blower.
Critical Factors:
a. Gas temperature [300 to 600 ° F]
b. High pressure head [1.5 to 8 psi]
Important Factors:
a. High rotor speed [2000 to 3500 rpm]
b. H;S04 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [50 to 100%]
C. Misaligned Wheel Bearings of Blower.
Critical Factors:
a. High pressure head [1.5 to 6 psi]
b. High rotor speed [2000 to 4500 rmp]
Important Factors:
a. Gas temperature [200 to 500 ’ F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.08 to 0.5 lb/ft3]
D. Cracked Wheel of Blower.
Critical Factors:
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a. High pressure head [1.5 to 6 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Gas temperature [600 to 850 *F]
b. H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 02 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [50 to 100%]
E. Damaged Shaft Seals o f Blower.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc, in gas [0.005 to 20 grains/ft3]
b. Gas temperature [200 to 500 ”F]
Important Factors:
a. High rotor speed [2000 to 4500 rmp]
b. H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 02 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [50 to 100%]
F. Expanded Shaft of Blower.
Critical Factors:
a. Gas temperature [300 to 700 ° F]
Important Factors:
a. High rotor speed [1500 to 4000]
b. High head pressure [2 to 5 psi]
G. Worn Wheel Blades o f Blower.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc, in gas [0.005 to 20 grains/ft3]
Important Factors:
a. High rotor speed [2000 to 4500 rmp]
b. H2S 04 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 02 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
d. Gas temperature [300 to 500 ° F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.1 to 0.6 lb/ft3]
H. Misaligned Couplings Inlet Bells of Blower.
Critical Factors:
a. High rotor speed [3000 to 5000 rpm]
Important Factors:
a. High head pressure [2 to 5 psi]
b. Gas temperature [300 to 500 ° F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.08 to 0.5 lb/ft3]
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I. Worn Scroll and Housing Liners of Blower.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc, in gas [0.005 to 20 grains/ft3]
Important Factors:
a. H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
b. C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
c. Gas temperature [200 to 600 *F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.08 to 0.5 lb/ft3]
b. Humidity [50 to 100%]
J. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive fluid [1 to 10% solids by weight]
b. PV factor [35000 to 70000 psi * ft/min]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [100 to 750 *F]
b Fluid pH [ 4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Impeller speed [3000 to 6000 rpm]
b. Fluid viscosity [150 to 1000 SSU]
K. Worn Impeller of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive fluid [1 to 8 % solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [200 to 400 ° F]
b. Fluid pH [ 4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Impeller speed [1200 to 5000 rpm]
b. Fluid viscosity [150 to 800 SSU]
L. Faulty Thrust Bearings o f Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Combined stress on bearings [1000 to 5000 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [120 to 300" F or 40 to 0 “F]
b. Impeller speed [1500 to 5000 rpm]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [60 to 100%]
M. Deformed Shaft o f Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Impeller speed [1000 to 4500 rpm]
b. Combined stress on shaft [1500 to 6000 psi]
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Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [300 to 650 *F or 20 to 0 *F]
Related Factors:
a. Suction pressure [10 to 30 psi]
b. Fluid pH [4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
c. Fluid viscosity [100 to 1000 SSU]
N. Leaking Casing o f Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. PV factor [4000 to 70000 psi * ft/min]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [150 to 400 *F]
b. Fluid pH [4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Suction pressure [15 to 50 psi]
O. Faulty Shaft Couplings o f Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Combined stress on shaft [2000 to 7000 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Impeller speed [1000 to 5000 rpm]
b. Fluid temperature [150 to 700 'F]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [80 to 100%]
b. Fluid viscosity [100 to 1000 SSU]
P. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive fluid [1 to 10 % solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Impeller speed [3000 to 4500 rpm or 1500 to 700 rpm]
Related Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [200 to 500 ° F]
b. Fluid viscosity [200 to 1000 SSU]
Q. Plugged Spray Nozzle in Combustion Chamber.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in air [0.05 to 20 grains/ft3]
b. Abrasive substances in liquid fuel [0.1 to 2% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Low air rate [750 to 550 fF/min]
b. Flame temperature [1200 to 1700 *F]
Related Factors:
a. Low atomizing pressure [4 to 2 psi]
b. Low operating liquid rate [30 to 15 short tons/day]
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R. Carbonaceous Matter Formation in Combustion Chamber.
Critical Factors:
a. Ash content in liquid fuel [0.05 to 0.1% solids by weight]
b. Carbon dioxide content in burner gas [0.27 to 0.8% of total volume]
c. Carbon content in liquid fuel [0.5 to 1% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in air [0.05 to 20 grains/ft3]
Related Factors:
a. High air rate [550 to 750 ftVmin]
b. High operating liquid rate [15 to 30 short tons/day]

CENTRIFUGAL BLOWER Ref. [10, 16, 77, 53, 64. 78]
A. Obstructed Inlet or Outlet Ducts.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like dust, fly ash, and sand in gas [0.005 to 20 grains/ft3)
Important Factors:
a. Gas density [0.1 to 0.6 lb/ft3]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [50 to 100%]
B. Cracked Inlet Box.
Critical Factors:
a. Gas temperature [300 to 600 *F]
b. High pressure head [1.5 to 8 psi]
Important Factors:
a. High rotor speed [2000 to 3500 rpm]
b. H,S04 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. CO, partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [50 to 100%]
C. Misaligned Wheel Bearings.
Critical Factors:
a. High pressure head [1.5 to 6 psi]
b. High rotor speed [2000 to 4500 rmp]
Important Factors:
a. Gas temperature [200 to 500 ° F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.08 to 0.5 lb/ft3]
D. Cracked Wheel.
Critical Factors:
a. High pressure head [1.5 to 6 psi]
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Important Factors:
a. Gas temperature [600 to 850 ' F]
b. H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [50 to 100%]
E. Damaged Shaft Seals.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc, in gas [0.005 to 20 grains/fit3]
b. Gas temperature [200 to 500 ”F]
Important Factors:
a. High rotor speed [2000 to 4500 rmp]
b. H2S 04 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. CO, partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [50 to 100%]
F. Expanded Shaft.
Critical Factors:
a. Gas temperature [300 to 700 ° F]
Important Factors:
a. High rotor speed [1500 to 4000]
b. High head pressure [2 to 5 psi]
G. Worn Wheel Blades.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc, in gas [0.005 to 20 grains/ft3]
Important Factors:
a. High rotor speed [2000 to 4500 rmp]
b. H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
d. Gas temperature [300 to 500 ’ F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.1 to 0.6 lb/ft3]
H. Misaligned Couplings Inlet Bells.
Critical Factors:
a. High rotor speed [3000 to 5000 rpm]
Important Factors:
a. High head pressure [2 to 5 psi]
b. Gas temperature [300 to 500 ’ F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.08 to 0.5 lb/ft3]
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I. Worn Scroll and Housing Liners.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc, in gas [0.005 to 20 grains/ft3]
Important Factors:
a. H2S 04 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
b. C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
c. Gas temperature [200 to 600 *F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.08 to 0.5 lb/ft3]
b. Humidity [50 to 100%]

CENTRIFUGAL PUMP Ref. [8, 15,41, 42, 74, 86, 89, 108]
A. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive fluid [ 1 to 10% solids by weight]
b. PV factor [35000 to 70000 psi * ft/min]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [100 to 750 ' F]
b Fluid pH [ 4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Impeller speed [3000 to 6000 rpm]
b. Fluid viscosity [150 to 1000 SSU]
B. Worn Impeller.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive fluid [1 to 8 % solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [200 to 400 ° F]
b Fluid pH [ 4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Impeller speed [1200 to 5000 rpm]
b. Fluid viscosity [150 to 800 SSU]
C. Faulty Thrust Bearings.
Critical Factors:
a. Combined stress on bearings [1000 to 5000 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [120 to 3000F or 40 to 0 *F]
b. Impeller speed [1500 to 5000 rpm]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [60 to 100%]

163

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

D. Deformed Shaft.
Critical Factors:
a. Impeller speed [1000 to 4500 rpm]
b. Combined stress on shaft [1500 to 6000 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [300 to 650 *F or 20 to 0 ’ F]
Related Factors:
a. Suction pressure [10 to 30 psi]
b. Fluid pH [4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
c. Fluid viscosity [100 to 1000 SSU]
E. Leaking Casing.
Critical Factors:
a. PV factor [4000 to 70000 psi * ft/min]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [150 to 400 *F]
b Fluid pH [4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Suction pressure [15 to 50 psi]
F. Faulty Shaft Couplings.
Critical Factors:
a. Combined stress on shaft [2000 to 7000 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Impeller speed [1000 to 5000 rpm]
b. Fluid temperature [150 to 700 *F]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [80 to 100%]
b. Fluid viscosity [100 to 1000 SSU]
G. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive fluid [1 to 10 % solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Impeller speed [3000 to 4500 rpm or 1500 to 700 rpm]
Related Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [200 to 500 *F]
b. Fluid viscosity [200 to 1000 SSU]

CONVERTER Ref. [21, 23, 45, 51, 63, 64]
A. Damaged Supporting Grids.
Critical Factors:
a. Gas temperature [700 to 1000 "F]
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b. Catalyst weight [500 to 3000 lb]
Important Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc, in gas [0.2 to 10 grains/ft3]
Related Factors:
a. Catalyst pH [4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
b. H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
B. Corroded or Cracked Supporting Flanges.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc, in gas [0.1 to 8 grains/ft3]
b. Catalyst weight [1000 to 2000 lb]
Important Factors:
a. Gas temperature [500 to 1000 *F]
b. H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.15 to 0.7 lb/ft3]
C. Plugged Vessel Walls and Ducts.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc., in gas [0.1 to 8 grains/ft3]
Important Factors:
a. Gas temperature [700 to 1000 ’ F]
b. H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi
d. Averaged total gas mass velocity [60 to 100 fit3/ min/ft2]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.08 to 0.6 lb/ft3]
b. Humidity [75 to 100%]
D. Fouled Heat Exchanger Tubes.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances like sand, fly ash, dust, etc., in gas [0.1 to 10 grains/ft3]
b. Gas velocity inside heat exchanger tubes [80 to 40 ft3/ min/fit2]
Important Factors:
a. Gas temperature [300 to 900 *F]
b. H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.1 to 0.7 lb/ft3]
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DISTILLATION TOWER Ref. [1, 9, 16, 21, 45, 53, 63, 75]
A. Deformed or Broken Rings.
Critical Factors:
a. High column holdup [10 to 30%]
Important Factors:
a. Average tower top pressure drop [10 to 20%]
Related Factors:
a. Leaving liquid temperature [20 to -20 “F or 150 to 300 " F]
B. Unleveled Liquid Distributor.
Critical Factors:
a. Start-up pressure surge [0.5 to 1 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Fed liquid rate [3000 to 10000 lb/ftr per hr]
Related Factors:
a. Fed liquid viscosity [800 to 3000 SSU]
C. Plugged or Corroded Distributor.
Critical Factors:
a. Low fed liquid rate [2000 to 500 lb/ft2 per hr]
b. Abrasive substances (slurry) in liquid [5 to 20% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Liquid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Fed liquid viscosity [800 to 3000 SSU]
D. Fouled Column Packing or Internals.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances (slurry) in liquid input mixture [5 to 20% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Fed liquid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
b. H2S 04 partial pressure in leaving gas [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. C 0 2 partial pressure in leaving gas [1.5 to 150 psi
Related Factors:
a. Fed liquid viscosity [500 to 2500 SSU]

EVAPORATOR Ref. [5, 63, 64,68, 81, 90, 108]
A. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive fluid [1 to 10% solids by weight]
b. PV factor [35000 to 70000 psi * ft/min]
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Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [100 to 750 ' F]
b Fluid pH [ 4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Impeller speed [3000 to 6000 rpm]
b. Fluid viscosity [150 to 1000 SSU]
B. Worn Impeller of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive fluid [1 to 8 % solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [200 to 400 ‘ F]
b. Fluid pH [ 4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Impeller speed [1200 to 5000 rpm]
b. Fluid viscosity [150 to 800 SSU]
C. Faulty Thrust Bearings of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Combined stress on bearings [1000 to 5000 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [120 to 300 ”F or 40 to 0 ' F]
b. Impeller speed [1500 to 5000 rpm]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [60 to 100%]
D. Deformed Shaft of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Impeller speed [1000 to 4500 rpm]
b. Combined stress on shaft [1500 to 6000 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [300 to 650 *F or 20 to 0 ° F]
Related Factors:
a. Suction pressure [10 to 30 psi]
b. Fluid pH [4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
c. Fluid viscosity [100 to 1000 SSU]
E. Leaking Casing of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. PV factor [4000 to 70000 psi * ft/min]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [150 to 400 " F]
b. Fluid pH [4 to 0 and 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Suction pressure [15 to 50 psi]
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F. Faulty Shaft Couplings of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Combined stress on shaft [2000 to 7000 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Impeller speed [1000 to 5000 rpm]
b. Fluid temperature [150 to 700 ’ F]
Related Factors:
a. Humidity [80 to 100%]
b. Fluid viscosity [100 to 1000 SSU]
G. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring of Pump.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive fluid [1 to 10 % solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Impeller speed [3000 to 4500 rpm or 1500 to 700 rpm]
Related Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [200 to 500 *F]
b. Fluid viscosity [200 to 1000 SSU]
H. Broken Tube Support Baffles of Heat Exchanger.
Critical Factors:
a. Shell-side liquid or gas temperature [250 to 500 " F]
Important Factors:
a. Shell-side liquid cross flow velocity [8 to 12 ft/s]
b. Shell-side gas pressure [50 to 500 psi]
c. Shell-side gas H2S 04 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
d. Shell-side gas C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid viscosity [150 to 800 SSU]
b. Shell-side gas density [0.1 to 0.6 lb/ft3]
I Cracked Tubes of Heat Exchanger.
Critical Factors:
a. Tube-side temperature [30 to -100 *F]
b. Shell-side temperature [300 to 500 ° F]
Important Factors:
a. Tube-side fluid cross flow velocity [7 to 15 ft/s]
b. Abrasive substances in shell-side gas [0.1 to 20 grains/ft3]
c. Abrasive substances in shell-side fluid [2 to 10% solids by weight]
d. Abrasive substances in tube-side fluid [2 to 10% solids by weight]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid cross flow velocity [9 to 15 ft/s]
b. Shell-side gas pressure [50 to 500 psi]
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J Deformed Impingement Plate o f Heat Exchanger.
Critical Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid cross flow velocity [9 to 15 ft/s]
b. Shell-side gas pressure [50 to 500 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Shell-side temperature [150 to 800 *F]
b. Abrasive substances in shell-side gas [0.1 to 20 grains/ft3]
c. Abrasive substances in shell-side fluid [2 to 10% solids by weight]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid cross flow velocity [9 to 15 ft/s]
b. Shell-side gas pressure [50 to 500 psi]
K Fouled Tubes o f Heat Exchanger.
Critical Factors:
a. Shell-side liquid or gas temperature [150 to 800 ° F]
b. Abrasive substdnces in shell-side gas [0.1 to 20 grains/ft3]
c. Abrasive substances in shell-side fluid [1 to 8% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Low shell-side liquid cross flow velocity [15 to 3 ft/s]
b. Tube-side fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
c. Shell-side gas H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
d. Shell-side gas C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid viscosity [100 to 700 SSU]
b. Tube-side fluid viscosity [100 to 700 SSU]
c. Shell-side gas density [0.1 to 0.5 lb/fit3]
L. Corroded Exchanger and Kettle Surfaces.
Critical Factors:
a. Tube-side fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
b. Shell-side gas H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
c. Shell-side gas C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Shell-side liquid cross flow velocity [7 to 13 ft/s]
b. Atmospheric humidity [80 to 100%]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid viscosity [100 to 500 SSU]
b. Tube-side fluid viscosity [100 to 500 SSU]
c. Shell-side gas density [0.1 to 0.5 lb/ft3]
M. Plugged or Corroded Vapor Heads Walls.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substance in final liquor [1 to 8% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Liquor pH [4 to 0 and 10 to 14]

169

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

b. Liquor temperature [100 to 350 " F]
Related Factors:
a. Final liquor viscosity [800 to 3000 SSU]
N. Leaking Circulation Pipe Joints.
Critical Factors:
a. Liquor temperature [200 to 750 “F]
b. Average fluid pressure in circulation pipe [100 to 500 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Average fluid cross flow velocity in pipe [10 to 20 ft/s]
Related Factors:
a. Liquor pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
O. Plugged Tube Inlets.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substance in final liquor [3 to 10% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Average temperature in circulation pipe [150 to 300 ’ F]
b. Average cross flow velocity in circulation pipe [9 to 5 ft/s]
Related Factors:
a. Final liquor viscosity [800 to 3000 SSU]

HEAT EXCHANGER Ref. [16,27, 29, 53, 61, 83]
A. Broken Tube Support Baffles.
Critical Factors:
a. Shell-side liquid or gas temperature [250 to 500 *F]
Important Factors:
a. Shell-side liquid cross flow velocity [8 to 12 ft/s]
b. Shell-side gas pressure [50 to 500 psi]
c. Shell-side fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
d. Shell-side gas H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
e. Shell-side gas CO, partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid viscosity [150 to 800 SSU]
b. Shell-side gas density [0.1 to 0.6 lb/ft3]
B. Cracked Tubes.
Critical Factors:
a. Tube-side temperature [30 to -100 ’ F]
b. Shell-side temperature [300 to 500 *F]
Important Factors:
a. Tube-side fluid cross flow velocity [7 to 15 fit/s]
b. Abrasive substances in shell-side gas [0.1 to 20 grains/ft3]
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c. Abrasive substances in shell-side fluid [2 to 10% solids by weight]
d. Abrasive substances in tube-side fluid [2 to 10% solids by weight]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid cross flow velocity [9 to 15 ft/s]
b. Shell-side gas pressure [50 to 500 psi]
C. Deformed Impingement Plate.
Critical Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid cross flow velocity [9 to 15 ft/s]
b. Shell-side gas pressure [50 to 500 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Shell-side temperature [150 to 800 ’ F]
b. Abrasive substances in shell-side gas [0.1 to 20 grains/ft3]
c. Abrasive substances in shell-side fluid [2 to 10% solids by weight]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid cross flow velocity [9 to 15 ft/s]
b. Shell-side gas pressure [50 to 500 psi]
D. Fouled Tubes.
Critical Factors:
a. Shell-side liquid or gas temperature [150 to 800 ° F]
b. Abrasive substances in shell-side gas [0.1 to 20 grains/ft3]
c. Abrasive substances in shell-side fluid [1 to 8% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Low shell-side liquid cross flow velocity [15 to 3 ft/s]
b. Tube-side fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
c. Shell-side fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
d. Shell-side gas H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
e. Shell-side gas C 02 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid viscosity [100 to 700 SSU]
b. Tube-side fluid viscosity [100 to 700 SSU]
c. Shell-side gas density [0.1 to 0.5 lb/ft3]
E. Corroded Exchanger and Kettle Surfaces.
Critical Factors:
a. Tube-side fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
b. Shell-side fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
c. Shell-side gas H2S 04 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psi]
d. Shell-side gas C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Shell-side liquid cross flow velocity [7 to 13 ft/s]
b. Atmospheric humidity [80 to 100%]
Related Factors:
a. Shell-side fluid viscosity [100 to 500 SSU]
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b. Tube-side fluid viscosity [100 to 500 SSU]
c. Shell-side gas density [0.1 to 0.5 lb/ft3]

MULTISTAGE COMPRESSOR Ref. [16, 27, 29, 53, 61, 83]
A. Deformed Thrust Bearings.
Critical Factors:
a. Loads on thrust bearings [150 to 500 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Rotor speed [3000 to 20000 rpm]
Related Factors:
a. Atmospheric humidity [60 to 100%]
B. Plugged Stationary Elements.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in gas [0.01 to 20 grains/ft3]
Important Factors:
a. Gas H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psia]
b. Gas C 02 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psia]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.1 to 0.6 lb/ft3]
C. Eroded Impellers Exit Tips.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in gas [0.05 to 10 grains/ft3]
Important Factors:
a. Inlet capacity [25000 to 30000 ft3]
b. Rotor speed [3000 to 20000 rpm]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.15 to 0.7 lb/ft3]
D. Damaged Shaft and Interstage (Labyrinth) Seals.
Critical Factors:
a. Gas temperature [200 to 500 *F]
Important Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in gas [0.01 to 20 grains/fit3]
b. Discharge pressure [ 10 to 20 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.08 to 0.5 lb/ft3]
b. Atmospheric humidity [60 to 100%]
E. Misaligned Shaft.
Critical Factors:
a. Rotor speed [3000 to 10000 rpm]
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Important Factors:
a. Gas temperature [300 to 600 ‘ F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.15 to 0.7 lb/ft3]
b. Atmospheric humidity [80 to 100%]

PIPE (low pressure gas) Ref. [28, 70, 73, 94, 103]
A. Leaking Fittings or Joints.
Critical Factors:
a. Gas pressure [250 to 500 psi]
b. Gas temperature [400 to 750 ‘ F]
Important Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in gas [0.8 to 15 grains/ft3]
b. Gas H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psia]
c. Gas C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psia]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.15 to 0.6 lb/fit3]
B. Cracked Pipe Due To Over-stress.
Critical Factors:
a. Pressure surges between 30 to 50% of MAOP (maximum allowable operating pressure)
Important Factors:
a. Gas pressure [200 to 500 psi]
b. Gas temperature [400 to 500 *F]
Related Factors:
a. Gas H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psia]
b. Gas C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psia]
C. Plugged Inner Section.
a. Abrasive substances in gas [0.8 to 15 grains/ft3]
Important Factors:
a. Gas temperature [200 to 500 ° F]
b. Gas H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psia]
c. Gas CO, partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psia]
Related Factors:
a. Gas density [0.15 to 0.6 lb/ft3]
D. Bent Pipe.
Critical Factors:
a. Average span between supports [10 to 17 ft]
b. Gas temperature [350 to 600 “F or -10 to -20 ' F]
Important Factors:
a. Gas pressure [350 to 600 psi]
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Related Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in gas [0.8 to 15 grains/ft3]
E. Corroded or Eroded Inner Wall.
Critical Factors:
a. Gas H2S 0 4 partial pressure [0.15 to 75 psia]
b. Gas C 0 2 partial pressure [1.5 to 150 psia]
Important Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in gas [0.8 to 15 grains/ft3]
b. Gas temperature [200 to 500 ' F]
Related Factors:
a. Atmospheric humidity [70 to 100%]

PIPE (low pressure fluid) Ref. [28, 70, 73, 94, 103]
A. Leaking Fittings or Joints.
Critical Factors:
a. Fluid pressure [250 to 500 psi]
b. Fluid temperature [400 to 750 ’ F]
Important Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in fluid [3 to 10% solids by weight]
b. Fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Fluid viscosity [500 to 3000 SSU]
B. Cracked Pipe Due To Over-stress.
Critical Factors:
a. Pressure surges between 10 to 20% of MAOP (maximum allowable operating pressure)
Important Factors:
a. Fluid pressure [100 to 150 psi]
b. Fluid temperature [300 to 450 ”F]
c. Fluid cross flow velocity [12 to 22 fit/s]
Related Factors:
a. Fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
C. Plugged Inner Section.
a. Abrasive substances in fluid [5 to 10% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid temperature [150 to 300 ’F]
b. Fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
c. Low fluid cross flow velocity [8 to 3 ft/s]
Related Factors:
a. Fluid viscosity [800 to 3500 SSU]
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D. Bent Pipe.
Critical Factors:
a. Average span between supports [8 to 14 ft]
b. Gas temperature [350 to 600 *F or -20 to -30 ' F]
Important Factors:
a. Fluid pressure [100 to 200 psi]
Related Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in fluid [5 to 10% solids by weight]
E. Corroded or Eroded Inner Wall.
Critical Factors:
a. Fluid pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
Important Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in fluid [5 to 15% solids by weight]
b. Fluid temperature [100 to 400 ° F]
c. Fluid cross flow velocity [10 to 20 ft/s]
Related Factors:
a. Atmospheric humidity [70 to 100%]

REACTOR Ref. [7, 64, 65, 96, 101, 111]
A. Worn or faulty Stirrer Couplings.
Critical Factors:
a. Reaction temperature [200 to 800 ° F]
Important Factors:
a. Mixture viscosity [500 to 3000 SSU]
b. Stirrer velocity [50 to 100 rpm]
Related Factors:
a. Solution pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
B. Non-Iubricated Drive Bearings and Gears.
Critical Factors:
a. Atmospheric humidity [60 to 100%]
Important Factors:
a. Reaction temperature [150 to 700 ° F]
Related Factors:
a. Stirrer velocity [60 to 100 rpm]
C. Damaged Discharged Nozzle Seals.
Critical Factors:
a. Reaction temperature [200 to 600 *F]
Important Factors:
a. Vessel pressure [14.7 to 29.4 psi]
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Related Factors:
a. Mixture viscosity [300 to 2500 SSU]
D. Defective Heating Coils.
Important Factors:
a. Atmospheric humidity [80 to 100%]
b. Reaction temperature [200 to 700 *F]

WASTE HEAT BOILER Ref. [2, 9, 16, 45, 63, 78, 109]
A. Broken Expansion Joints.
Critical Factors:
a. Heating medium temperature [300 to 800 *F]
Important Factors:
a. Kettle pressure [50 to 150 psig]
b. Low heating medium cross-flow velocity [10 to 3 ft/s]
Related Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in kettle water [1 to 10% solids by weight]
B. Fouled Tubes.
Critical Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in kettle water [2 to 10% solids by weight]
b. Abrasive substances in heating medium [2 to 10% solids by weight]
Important Factors:
a. Heating medium temperature [200 to 800 *F]
b. Low heating medium cross-flow velocity [15 to 3 ft/s]
c. Heating medium and “water” pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
Related Factors:
a. Heating medium viscosity [200 to 1000 SSU]
b. Kettle pressure [80 to 150 psig]
C. Deformed Demister Mesh Pad.
Critical Factors:
a. Steam pressure [50 to 150 psi]
Important Factors:
a. Kettle temperature [100 to 400 ”F]
Related Factors:
a. Kettle “water” pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
D. Cracked Boiler Drum Shell.
Critical Factors:
a. Kettle temperature [250 to 800 *F]
b. Kettle pressure [100 to 150 psig]
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Important Factors:
a. Abrasive substances in water [1 to 8% solids by weight]
Related Factors:
a. Kettle “water” pH [4 to 0 or 10 to 14]
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APPENDIX D
FAILURE MODES LOCAL AND PRODUCT EFFECTS

The information included in this appendix was obtained by series of interviews conducted
with doctoral students o f the department of Chemical Engineering at the University of
Alabama.

Specialized equipment maintenance literature (see references) was also

consulted.

BURNER Ref. [9, 21, 23, 24, 25, 53, 63, 86, 108]
A. Obstructed Inlet or Outlet Ducts of Blower.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
B. Cracked Inlet Box of Blower.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 4
C. Misaligned Wheel Bearings of Blower.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 2
D. Cracked Wheel of Blower.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
E. Damaged Shaft Seals of Blower.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 3
F. Expanded Shaft of Blower.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 4
G. Worn Wheel Blades o f Blower.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
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H. Misaligned Couplings Inlet Bells of Blower.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 2
I. Worn Scroll and Housing Liners of Blower.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
J. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box of Pump.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 4
K. Worn Impeller of Pump.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 3
L. Faulty Thrust Bearings of Pump.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
M. Deformed Shaft of Pump.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 4
N. Leaking Casing o f Pump.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 3
O. Faulty Shaft Couplings of Pump.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 4
P. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring of Pump.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 2
Q. Plugged Spray Nozzle in Combustion Chamber.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
R. Carbonaceous Matter Formation in Combustion Chamber.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 1
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CENTRIFUGAL BLOWER Ref. [10, 16, 77, 53, 64, 78]
A. Obstructed Inlet or Outlet Ducts.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 2
B. Cracked Inlet Box.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
C. Misaligned Wheel Bearings.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 2
D. Cracked Wheel.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 2
E. Damaged Shaft Seals.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
F. Expanded Shaft.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
G. Worn Wheel Blades.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 1
H. Misaligned Couplings Inlet Bells.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 2
I. Worn Scroll and Housing Liners.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 2

CENTRIFUGAL PUMP Ref. [8, 15, 41, 42, 74, 86, 89, 108]
A. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 3
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B. Worn Impeller
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
C. Faulty Thrust Bearings.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 2
D. Deformed Shaft.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
E. Leaking Casing.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
F. Faulty Shaft Couplings.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
G. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 2

CONVERTER Ref. [21, 23.45, 51. 63, 64]
A. Damaged Supporting Grids.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 3
B. Corroded or Cracked Supporting Flanges.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 1
C. Plugged Vessel Walls and Ducts.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
D. Fouled Heat Exchanger Tubes.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 4
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DISTILLATION TOWER Ref. [1, 9, 16, 21, 45, 53, 63, 75]
A. Deformed or Broken Rings.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
B. Unleveled Liquid Distributor.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 1
C. Plugged or Corroded Distributor.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
D. Fouled Column Packing or Internals.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 4

EVAPORATOR Ref. [5, 63, 64, 68, 81, 90, 108]
A. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box of Pump.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
B. Worn Impeller of Pump.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
C. Faulty Thrust Bearings of Pump.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
D. Deformed Shaft of Pump.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
E. Leaking Casing of Pump.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 2
F. Faulty Shaft Couplings of Pump.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 4
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G. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring of Pump.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 2
H. Broken Tube Support Baffles of Heat Exchanger.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
I. Cracked Tubes of Heat Exchanger.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 4
J. Deformed Impingement Plate of Heat Exchanger.
Local Effects: 1
Product Effects: 1
K. Fouled Tubes o f Heat Exchanger.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
L. Corroded Exchanger and Kettle Surfaces.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
M. Plugged or Corroded Vapor Heads Walls.
Local Effects: 1
Product Effects: 2
N. Leaking Circulation Pipe Joints.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
O. Plugged Tube Inlets.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 3

HEAT EXCHANGER Ref. [16, 27, 29, 53, 61, 83]
A. Broken Tube Support Baffles.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
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B. Cracked Tubes.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 4
C. Deformed Impingement Plate.
Local Effects: 1
Product Effects: 1
D. Fouled Tubes.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3
E. Corroded Exchanger and Kettle Surfaces.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2

MULTISTAGE COMPRESSOR Ref. [16, 27, 29, 53, 61, 83]
A. Deformed Thrust Bearings.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 4
B. Plugged Stationary Elements.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
C. Eroded Impellers Exit Tips.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
D. Damaged Shaft and Interstage (Labyrinth) Seals.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
E. Misaligned Shaft.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 3

PIPE Ref. [28, 70, 73, 94, 103]
A. Leaking Fittings or Joints.
Local Effects: 1
Product Effects: 3
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B. Cracked Pipe Due To Over-stress.
Local Effects: 1
Product Effects: 3
C. Plugged Inner Section.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 3
D. Bent Pipe.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
E. Corroded or Eroded Inner Wall.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2

REACTOR Ref. [7, 64, 65, 96, 101, 111]
A. Worn or faulty Stirrer Couplings.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 2
B. Non-lubricated Drive Bearings and Gears.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 2
C. Damaged Discharged Nozzle Seals.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 3
D. Defective Heating Coils.
Local Effects: 2
Product Effects: 3

WASTE HEAT BOILER R ef [2, 9, 16, 45, 63, 78, 109]
A. Broken Expansion Joints.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
B. Fouled Tubes.
Local Effects: 3
Product Effects: 3
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C. Deformed Demister Mesh Pad.
Local Effects: 1
Product Effects: 2
D. Cracked Boiler Drum Shell.
Local Effects: 4
Product Effects: 4
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APPENDIX E
FAILURE MODES NMS, DMS, NES, AND DES VALUES

The NMS, DMS, NES, and DES values depicted in this appendix were obtained by series
of interviews conducted with doctoral students o f the department of Chemical
Engineering at the University of Alabama. Specialized equipment maintenance literature
(see references) was also consulted.

BURNER Ref. [9, 21, 23, 24, 25, 53, 63, 86, 108]
A. Obstructed Inlet or Outlet Ducts of Blower.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
DES
Centrifugal Blower
0.25
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
0.00
Converter
0.00
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
0.00
Pipe
0.00
0.00
Reactor
0.00
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00
0.00
B. Cracked Inlet Box of Blower.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Blower
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

C. Misaligned Wheel Bearings of Blower.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.25
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

D. Cracked Wheel of Blower.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Blower
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

E. Damaged Shaft Seals of Blower.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Blower
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.00

F. Expanded Shaft of Blower.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.25
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

0.00
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

G. Worn Wheel Blades of Blower.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
H. Misaligned Couplings Inlet Bells of Blower.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
DES
Centrifugal Blower
0.25
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
0.00
Converter
0.00
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
0.00
Pipe
0.00
0.00
Reactor
0.00
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00
0.00
I. Worn Scroll and Housing Liners of Blower.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
DES
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
0.00
Converter
0.25
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
0.00
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Centrifugal Blower
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

J. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25

Box of Pump.

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

K. Worn Impeller of Pump.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

L. Faulty Thrust Bearings of Pump.
NMS = 0.75
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Centrifugal Pump
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.25

M. Deformed Shaft of Pump.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

N. Leaking Casing of Pump.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
O. Faulty Shaft Couplings of Pump.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

P. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring of Pump.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
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Centrifugal Blower
Converter
Distillation Tower
Evaporator
Centrifugal Pump
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

NES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.25
0.50
0.50
0.00
0.25
0.25

Q. Plugged Spray Nozzle in Combustion Chamber.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
R. Carbonaceous Matter Formation in Combustion Chamber.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted

CENTRIFUGAL BLOWER Ref. [10, 16, 77, 53,64, 78]
A. Obstructed Inlet or Outlet Ducts.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

B. Cracked Inlet Box.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Distillation Tower
Evaporator
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

C. Misaligned Wheel Bearings.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.25
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

D. Cracked Wheel.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

E. Damaged Shaft Seals.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Distillation Tower
Evaporator
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

F. Expanded Shaft.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.25
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

G. Worn W heel Blades.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
H. Misaligned Couplings Inlet Bells.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

I. Worn Scroll and Housing Liners.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.75 pipe transmitted
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Burner
Centrifugal Pump
Converter
Distillation Tower
Evaporator
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

NES
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

DES
0.25
0.00
0.50
0.25
0.50
0.00
0.75
0.00
0.00
0.00

CENTRIFUGAL PUMP Ref. [8, 15,41,42, 74.
A. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
DES
Burner
0.25
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
0.00
Converter
0.00
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.25
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
0.00
Pipe
0.00
0.00
Reactor
0.25
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25
0.00
B. Worn Impeller
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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C. Faulty Thrust Bearings.
NMS = 0.75
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.50
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.50
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.50
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25
D. Deformed Shaft.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

E. Leaking Casing.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
F. Faulty Shaft Couplings.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Evaporator
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.25
0.25

0.00
0.00
0.00

G. Faulty Impeller W ear Ring.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.00
0.25
0.25

CONVERTER Ref. [21, 23, 45, 51, 63, 64]
A. Damaged Supporting Grids.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
B. Corroded or Cracked Supporting Flanges.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
C. Plugged Vessel Walls and Ducts.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
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D. Fouled Heat Exchanger Tubes.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.75 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.75
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

DISTILLATION TOW ER Ref. [1,9, 16,21,45.
A. Deformed or Broken Rings.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 1.00 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
0.00
Evaporator
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.75
0.00

B. Unleveled Liquid Distributor.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
C. Plugged or Corroded Distributor.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.50 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
Converter
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.75
0.00
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Evaporator
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

D. Fouled Column Packing or Internals.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.50 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Converter
0.00
Evaporator
0.50
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.50

0.00
0.00
0.75
0.00
0.00
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

EVAPORATOR Ref. [5, 63, 64, 68, 81, 90, 108]
A. Damaged Mechanical Seals in Stuffing Box of Pump.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
DES
Burner
0.25
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
0.00
Converter
0.00
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.25
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.25
0.00
Pipe
0.00
0.00
Reactor
0.25
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25
0.00
B. Worn Impeller o f Pump
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25

DES
0.00
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Centrifugal Blower
Converter
Distillation Tower
Centrifugal Pump
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.00
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.25

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

C. Faulty Thrust Bearings of Pump.
NMS = 0.75
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

D. Deformed Shaft of Pump.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

E. Leaking Casing of Pump.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
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F. Faulty Shaft Couplings o f Pump.
NMS = 0.50
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

G. Faulty Impeller Wear Ring of Pump.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.00
0.25
0.25

H. Broken Tube Support Baffles of Heat Exchai
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
I. Cracked Tubes of Heat Exchanger.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
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Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

J. Deformed Impingement Plate of Heat Exchanger
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
K. Fouled Tubes of Heat Exchanger.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

L. Corroded Exchanger and Kettle Surfaces.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
DES
Burner
0.00
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
0.25
Converter
0.00
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
0.00
Pipe
0.00
0.00
Reactor
0.00
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00
0.00
M. Plugged or Corroded Vapor Heads Walls.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
N. Leaking Circulation Pipe Joints.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
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NES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

O. Plugged Tube Inlets.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

Burner
Centrifugal Blower
Centrifugal Pump
Converter
Distillation Tower
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

HEAT EXCHANGER Ref. [16, 27, 29, 53, 61, 83]
A. Broken Tube Support Baffles.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
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B. Cracked Tubes.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

C. Deformed Impingement Plate.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 pipe transmitted
D. Fouled Tubes.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

E. Corroded Exchanger and Kettle Surfaces.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
DES
Burner
0.00
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
0.25
Converter
0.00
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
0.00
Multistage Compressor
0.00
0.00
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Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

MULTISTAGE COMPRESSOR Ref. [16, 27, 29. 53. 61, 83]
A. Deformed Thrust Bearings.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.50 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.50
0.00

B. Plugged Stationary Elements.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00

C. Eroded Impellers Exit Tips.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.25

DES
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.25
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Distillation Tower
Evaporator
Heat Exchanger
Pipe
Reactor
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00

D. Damaged Shaft and Interstage (Labyrinth)!
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
DES
Burner
0.00
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
0.00
Converter
0.00
0.25
Distillation Tower
0.00
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.00
0.25
Pipe
0.00
0.00
Reactor
0.00
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00
0.00
E. Misaligned Shaft.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.25 pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.25
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.00
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25
Waste Heat Boiler
0.00

DES
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.00

PIPE Ref. [28, 70, 73, 94, 103]
A. Leaking Fittings or Joints.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00
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B. Cracked Pipe Due To Over-stress.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00

C. Plugged Inner Section.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00
D. Bent Pipe.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00
E. Corroded or Eroded Inner Wall.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00

REACTOR Ref. [7, 64, 65, 96, 101, 111]
A. Worn or faulty Stirrer Couplings.
NMS =0.75
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.50
Centrifugal Pump
0.50
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.50
Heat Exchanger
0.50
Multistage Compressor
0.50
Pipe
0.00
Waste Heat Boiler
0.50

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

B. Non-lubricated Drive Bearings and Gears.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00
C. Damaged Discharged Nozzle Seals.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.50 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.00
Centrifugal Blower
0.00
0.00
Centrifugal Pump

DES
0.00
0.00
0.25
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Converter
Distillation Tower
Evaporator
Heat Exchanger
Multistage Compressor
Pipe
Waste Heat Boiler

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

D. Defective Heating Coils.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00

WASTE HEAT BOILER Ref. [2, 9, 16, 45, 63, 78. 109]
A. Broken Expansion Joints.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
B. Fouled Tubes.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
C. Deformed Demister Mesh Pad.
NMS = 0.00
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
D. Cracked Boiler Drum Shell.
NMS = 0.25
DMS = 0.00 not pipe transmitted
NES
Burner
0.25
Centrifugal Blower
0.25
Centrifugal Pump
0.00
Converter
0.00
Distillation Tower
0.00
Evaporator
0.25
Heat Exchanger
0.25
Multistage Compressor
0.25
Pipe
0.00
Reactor
0.25

DES
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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APPENDIX F
SYSTEM OUTPUT SAMPLE REPORT

************* RCM CHEMICAL PROCESS EXPERT SYSTEM ***************

Project Name: SOLID.XLS

BL0WER2
No specific failure mode is of concern for this machine
BURNER_2
No specific failure mode is of concern for this machine
COMPRESSOR
No specific failure mode is of concern for this machine
HEAT_2
No specific failure mode is of concern for this machine
PUMP
No specific failure mode is of concern for this machine
REACTOR
No specific failure mode is of concern for this machine

//////// CRITICAL FAILURE MODES WWWW

Priority Index:64 [ LI:4, LEI:4, PEI:4, SFI:1]
*CONVERTER o F ouled Heat Exchanger Tubes.
Local Effects:
- Converter efficiency greatly reduced
- Increase in internal gas temperature
- Possible damage of flanges and support grids
- Reaction heat out of control
- Eventually, total loss of function
System Effects:
- Extremely high gas temperatures can damage
circulating pipes and downstream machines' seals
- If converter ceases working, the whole process will
probably have to be shut down
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Suggested Controls:
- Dye penetrant inspection
- Fluorescent (Zyglo) inspection
- Differential temperature control
Priority Index:36 [ LI:4, LEI:3, PEI:3, SFI: 1]
*BLOWER_l oC racked Inlet Box.
Local Effects:
- Flow pressure loss
- Overloading of the fan motor
- Gas/air leakage
- Eventual loss of equipment's function
System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature will get out of control
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- If handling gas, contamination hazard
- Possible corrosive effect on nearby equipment
Suggested Controls:
- Gas detector
- Visual inspection
- Dye penetrant inspection
Priority Index:26.25 [ LI:4, LEI:2, PEI:3, SFI: 1.09375]
*EVAPORATOR oPlugged Tube Inlets.
Local Effects:
- Liquid contamination
- Possible fouling of heat exchanger tubes
- Evaporator efficiency greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Contamination hazard
- Clogged inlets may affect the normal operation of
downstream pumps, compressors or distillation towers
- If evaporator ceases working, overall process may
have to be shut down
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Ultrasonic inspection
Priority Index:24 [ LI:4, LEI:3, PEI:2, SFI:1]
*BLOWER_l oM isaligned Wheel Bearings.
Local Effects:
- Motor overloaded
- Possible bending of shaft
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- Extreme equipment vibration and noise
- Blowing power loss
System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature may get out of control
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- Nearby equipment may be atrophied due to transmitted
vibration
Suggested Control:
- Mechanical running test
- Visual inspection
- Vibration analysis
- Rotor stability test
Priority Index:24 [ LI:4, LEI:3, PEI:2, SFI: 1]
*BLOWER_l oM isaligned Couplings Inlet Bells.
Local Effects:
- Overheating of bearings and motor
- Bearing failure
- Increase of bearing dust seals wear
System Effects:
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
Suggested Controls:
- Temperature detectors (thermocouples & electrical resistance detectors)
- Mechanical test
- Visual inspection
Priority Index: 17.5 [ LI:4, LEI:2, PEI:2, SFI: 1.09375]
*EVAPORATOR oC orroded Exchanger and Kettle Surfaces.
Local Effects:
- Apparatus efficiency greatly reduced
- Liquid contamination
- Liquid evaporation efficiency reduced
System Effects:
- Process temperature may go out of control
- Kettle scum may atrophy attached pipes and pumps
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Eddy current inspection
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Priority Index: 16 [ LI:4, LEI:2, PEI:2, SFI:1]
*DIST_TW4 oP lugged or Corroded Distributor.
Local Effects:
- Fluid contamination
- Reduced tower efficiency
- Poor liquid distribution
- Possible inappropriate column flooding
System Effects:
- Poor distillate quality
- Pumps or compressors handling distillate
may be slightly affected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Column differential pressure analysis
Priority Index: 16 [ LI:4, LEI:2, PEI:2, SFI:1]
*BLOWER_l oD am aged Shaft Seals.
Local Effects:
- Gas/air leakage around shaft
- Loss of blower pressure and efficiency
- Possible corrosion of other elements
System Effects:
- If blower used for cooling, system components
or product temperature will get out of control
- Electrical power supply to other equipment may be
affected if blower motor overloads
- If handling gas, contamination hazard
- Possible corrosive effect on nearby equipment
Suggested Controls:
- Static gas test
- Visual inspection
- Temperature detectors (thermocouples & electrical resistance detectors)
Priority Index: 16 [ LI:4, LEI:2, PEI:2, SFI:1]
*PIPE oC orroded or Eroded Inner Wall.
Local Effects:
- Development of "hot spots" on piping wall
- Eventual pipe fracture
- Fluid contamination
System Effects:
- Contaminated fluid may affect the normal functioning
of downstream machinery
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Suggested Controls:
- Ultrasonic inspection
- Eddy current inspection
Priority Index: 11.86798493 [ LI: 1.31866499, LEI:3, PEI:3, SFI:1]
*BOILER oFouIed Tubes.
Local Effects:
- Heating medium leakage into boiling water
- Substance contamination
- Equipment efficiency greatly reduced
System Effects:
- Product quality greatly affected
- If water is circulated, major equipment damage and
contamination should be expected in nearby areas
- Heating sub-system components may get wrecked
Suggested Controls:
- Ultrasonic inspection
- Differential temperature analysis
- Magnetic particle inspection
- Eddy current inspection
Priority Index:8 [ LI:4, LEI:1, PEI:2, SFI:1]
*EVAPORATOR oPlugged or Corroded Vapor Heads Walls.
Local Effects:
- Vapor entrainment
- Loss of evaporation efficiency
System Effects:
- Attached vents and ducts can be damaged
- No major effects on process should be expected
Suggested Controls:
- Visual inspection
- Ultrasonic inspection
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APPENDIX G
VALIDATION RESULTS

This appendix contains the main comments expressed by the experts after evaluating the
results generated by the program during the validation phase. The comments are sorted
by operation unit.

BURNER
The vast majority (85%) of the failure modes in the final RCM reports are frequently
encountered in industrial settings. The atomizing air rate should have a larger
contribution to the final failure mode screening. Failure modes associated with the
combustion chamber do not appear in the system’ final report as frequently as expected.

CENTRIFUGAL BLOWER
Although the system was very efficient detecting common failure modes for centrifugal
blowers, there were two, worn scroll and cracked inlet box, that rarely appeared in the
RCM analysis.

CENTRIFUGAL PUMP
This was one of the equipment units where the performance of the system was at its best.
Basically, all expected failure modes were properly detected and prioritized by the expert
system.

CONVERTER
Failure modes associated to the catalyst properties (weight, pH, etc.) were rarely
presented in the system’s final reports. All other failure modes were detected as
expected.

DISTILLATION TOWER
This should be renamed as “packed tower” since the system allows the user to employ it
as an absorbing or stripping unit. The impact of the liquid feed rate on the final results
was not as expected. All other factors were properly considered by the logic embedded in
the program.
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EVAPORATOR
All generated RCM analyses during the validation process yielded the expected results.
More failure modes for the vapor head component should be included in the knowledge
base.

HEAT EXCHANGER
The solutions obtained when liquid was assumed as tube-side substance were more
satisfactory than for the cases where gas was adopted as tube-side substance. This may
be a result of the way in which the system handles the gas density property when
screening the failure modes.

MULTISTAGE COMPRESSOR
All expected failure modes were correctly considered by the system during the validation
trials. However, the failure mode “plugged stationary elements” appeared in the final
reports twice as much as expected.

PIPELINE
All the system’s reports regarding gas and liquid pipelines were consistent with what was
expected.

REACTOR
More safety-related failure modes should be considered by the system. Also, failure
modes related to the reactor shaft should appear more in the system’s conclusion as it was
noticed in the validation process.

WASTE HEAT BOILER
A more precise parameter than the water pH should be used for accessing the effects of
“hard water” in the kettle walls of the apparatus. Nevertheless, the analyses given by the
system were very satisfactory , and consistent with what was expected.
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